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presidential administration that immigrants “never” appear in court drive central policy 
decisions on immigration enforcement, including growing the immigration detention 
system, limiting access to asylum, and building a border wall. By reviewing 
immigration court data from 2008 to 2018 made publicly available by the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review, this Article provides the first-ever independent analysis 
of in absentia removal orders. Contrary to claims that all immigrants abscond, our 
data-driven analysis reveals that 88% of all immigrants in immigration court with 
completed or pending removal cases over the past eleven years attended all of their court 
hearings. If we limit our analysis to only nondetained cases, we still find a high 
compliance rate: 83% of all respondents in completed or pending removal cases attended 
all of their hearings since 2008. Moreover, we reveal that 15% of those who were 
ordered deported in absentia since 2008 successfully reopened their cases and had their 
in absentia orders rescinded. Digging deeper, we identify three factors associated with 
in absentia removal: having a lawyer, applying for relief from removal (such as 
asylum), and court jurisdiction. These and other important findings have immediate 
implications for key immigration policy questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Do immigrants come to their immigration court hearings? This question 
is central to current debates about the immigration court system. President 
Donald Trump and members of his Administration have made bold and 
inconsistent claims about purportedly dismal court appearance rates. In 2018 
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and 2019, government officials contended that noncitizens never appear in 
court;1 that only 2% or 3% of immigrants appear in court;2 and that 20% appear 
in court.3 Policymakers rely on these and other assertions about purported 
failures to appear to drive key decisions, including to expand reliance on 
immigration detention4 and to reduce access to asylum.5 Appearance rates are 
also pivotal to the current debate about building a border wall, which the 
Administration has sought to justify in part by claiming that those who cross 
the southern border simply “vanish” into the country and never come to court.6 
 
1  See, e.g., Remarks During a Roundtable Discussion on Tax Reform in Cleveland, Ohio, 
2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (May 5, 2018) (“Our immigration laws are a disgrace . . . . We 
give them, like, trials. That’s the good news. The bad news is, they never show up for the trial. . . . 
Nobody ever shows up.”); Remarks Prior to a Working Lunch with President Kersti Kaljulaid of 
Estonia, President Raimonds Vejonis of Latvia, and President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania and 
an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3 (Apr. 3, 2018) (“We cannot have 
people flowing into our country illegally, disappearing, and, by the way, never showing up to court.”). 
2  Remarks at the American Farm Bureau Federation’s 100th Annual Convention in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6 (Jan. 14, 2019) (“Tell me, what percentage of 
people come back [for their trial]? Would you say 100 percent? No, you’re a little off. Like, how about 
2 percent? [Laughter] . . . Two percent come back. Those 2 percent are not going to make America 
great again, that I can tell you. [Laughter]”); Remarks at the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses 75th Anniversary Celebration, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 5 (June 19, 2018) (“Do 
you know, if a person comes in and puts one foot on our ground . . . they let the person go; they say 
show back up to court in 1 year from now. One year. . . . But here’s the thing: That in itself is 
ridiculous. Like 3 percent come back.”). 
3  White House Legislative Director Marc Short told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that “[e]ighty 
percent of those that are coming here illegally never show up for court and are never deported.” 
Kyle Feldscher & Marc Rod, White House Says Family Separations at the Border Are a ‘Binary Choice,’ but 
Stats Say Otherwise, CNN (June 18, 2018, 9:54 PM EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/family-
separations-marc-short-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3QY-BLSW] (internal quotation marks 
omitted). CNN reported that it was “unclear where Short got his statistic that 80% of the people 
who come to the US illegally do not show up for court.” Id. 
4  For example, amid claims that migrants will not come to court, President Trump has called 
for $4.2 billion in additional funding to dramatically increase the federal government’s capacity to 
detain immigrants. See President Donald J. Trump Calls on Congress to Secure Our Borders and Protect 
the American People, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
president-donald-j-trump-calls-congress-secure-borders-protect-american-people [https://perma.cc/
2NJH-WW5V]. 
5   On November 9, 2018, President Trump issued a presidential proclamation drastically 
reducing access to asylum, supported in part by a claim that under the present system, “many 
released aliens fail to appear for hearings.” Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661, 57,661 
(Nov. 9, 2018). 
6  See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 2, 2019, 12:04 
PM EST), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-
meeting-12 [https://perma.cc/DGU8-VBE6] (arguing that “[t]he United States needs a physical 
barrier, needs a wall, to stop illegal immigration” and claiming that without a wall asylum seekers will 
enter the country and instead of coming to court will “vanish[] and escape[] the law”). For an excellent 
review of the range of enforcement policies implemented by President Trump, see SHOBA SIVAPRASAD 
WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF TRUMP (2019). 
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Under the immigration law in effect since 1990, an immigration judge 
must order a noncitizen who misses even one court hearing deported.7 This 
type of deportation without the individual being present in court is called in 
absentia removal,8 based on the Latin phrase meaning “in the absence of.”9 
Prior to 1990, immigration judges had discretion over how to handle missed 
court appearances, including by holding an in absentia hearing, dismissing the 
case, continuing the case, or administratively closing the case.10 The 1990 
change in the law formally eliminated this judicial authority to make 
independent determinations as to how to proceed when respondents fail to 
appear in court.11 Instead, immigration judges must order removal in absentia 
if the respondent is not in court at the scheduled hearing, provided the 
government can first establish by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence” that the noncitizen is subject to removal and that written notice of 
the hearing was provided to the respondent.12 Those subject to in absentia 
 
7  See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5063 (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(a) (2018)) (“Any alien who . . . does not attend a proceeding 
under section 242, shall be ordered deported under section 242(b)(1) in absentia.”). As Eisha Jain has 
shown, deportation is just the tip of a larger enforcement system that bears many similarities to the 
criminal justice system. See generally Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1463 (2019). 
8  The term removal has been used since 1997 to refer to the decision of the immigration 
judge to order an individual removed from the United States. Prior to April 1997, removal 
proceedings were separated into distinct procedures for exclusion and deportation. See, e.g., Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 308(d)(4)(B), 
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (amending a section of the immigration law by “striking ‘exclusion or 
deportation’ and inserting ‘removal’”). 
9  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK, Glossary of Terms at 7 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/
2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3WF-W7S3] [hereinafter EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK]. 
10  Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 242(B)(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988); see 
also Memorandum from William R. Robie, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, Operating Policy and Procedure Memorandum 
84-2: Cases in Which Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear for Hearing 1 (Mar. 7, 1984), 
http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258649 [https://perma.cc/W2WH-WDP9] 
(describing operating policy and procedures for how immigration judges may proceed if a 
respondent fails to appear). See generally Iris Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting 
New Section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 75, 78-80 (1993) 
(discussing the impact of the 1990 reform in the in absentia law on judicial discretion). 
11  Immigration Act § 545(a), 104 Stat. at 5063. As Jason Cade has shown, government trial 
attorneys have very little discretion and must “present the government’s position” by requesting “in 
absentia removal orders against respondents who fail to show up.” Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of 
Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014). 
12  Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) 
(2018); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26 (2019) (defining in absentia hearings and identifying factors 
sufficient to order a respondent deported in absentia). EOIR defines an in absentia order as “[a]n 
order issued when an immigration judge determines that a removable alien received the required 
notice about their removal hearing and failed to appear.” EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, 
Glossary of Terms at 7. 
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removal are generally barred from seeking admission to the United States or 
relief from removal for a period of years.13 
Since the 1990 law was put in place, U.S. government officials have 
routinely relied on a purported rise in the prevalence of in absentia removal 
orders to support major policy shifts to the immigration system and to 
buttress legal arguments defending those changes. For example, in 1995 
Congress relied on government-produced statistics showing a “high rate of 
no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond” to change the 
immigration law to require that noncitizens with certain convictions be 
mandatorily detained pending deportation without access to a bond hearing.14 
In 2002, the Solicitor General cited those same government in absentia 
statistics as persuasive authority in defending against a challenge to the 
constitutionality of mandatory detention.15 The U.S. Supreme Court later 
relied on the government’s statistical claims to uphold as reasonable the 
constitutionality of mandatory detention for immigrants with criminal 
convictions to prevent “an unacceptable rate of flight.”16 More recently, 
officials from the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice (DOJ) have 
repeatedly told the public that many asylum seekers “simply disappear and 
never show up at their immigration hearings,”17 thus justifying tighter 
restrictions on the asylum law and even criminal prosecution of asylum 
seekers to prevent the court system from being “gamed.”18 Claims about 
 
13  See generally I.N.A. § 212(a)(6)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B) (2018) (providing that failure 
to appear without reasonable cause renders a noncitizen inadmissible for five years); I.N.A. 
§ 240(b)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7) (stating that failure to appear for a removal hearing bars a noncitizen 
from relief for ten years). 
14  S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 32 (1995); see also id. (“Congress should consider requiring that all 
aggravated felons be detained pending deportation. Such a step may be necessary because of the 
high rate of no-shows for those criminal aliens released on bond.”). The resulting mandatory 
detention rules for those with convictions are codified at I.N.A. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
15  Brief for Petitioners at 19, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491), 2002 WL 
31016560 (arguing that “more than 20% of criminal aliens who were released on bond or otherwise 
not kept in custody throughout their deportation proceedings failed to appear for those proceedings”). 
16  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519-20 (2003); see also id. at 519 (“Once released, more than 
20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings.”). 
17  Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-
sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/L6TA-BFFK]; see also 
Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on Immigration Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-
immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ZBN7-55FZ] (claiming that “loopholes in our laws 
[are] being exploited by illegal aliens” who, after release from detention, “simply disappear[]—never 
show[] up for their hearings in immigration court”). 
18  Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
supra note 17. For a thorough analysis of the rise in criminal prosecutions under the Trump 
Administration, see Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors). 
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failures to appear have also been relied upon by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) in rolling out the new Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) 
program that requires migrants to remain in Mexico to await their 
immigration court hearings.19 The Department of Health and Human 
Services and DHS have also prominently relied on purportedly high in 
absentia rates to argue in favor of radically restructuring the established 
system that protects children against long-term detention.20  
Summary adjudication of cases—without the opportunity to respond and 
without regard to the merits of the individual’s eligibility for relief—has been 
controversial and raises serious due process concerns.21 The practice also 
differs markedly from the criminal system, where failure to appear at trial is 
generally treated with issuance of an arrest warrant,22 not adjudication of the 
merits of the underlying case without the defendant present in court. For 
 
19  In announcing the MPP on December 20, 2018, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen claimed 
that without the new program asylum seekers would simply “disappear into the United States, where 
many skip their court dates.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Kirstjen M. 
Nielsen Announces Historic Action to Confront Illegal Immigration (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/20/secretary-nielsen-announces-historic-action-confront-illegal-
immigration [https://perma.cc/ZSS3-3SWB] (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Migrant 
Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/KZH4-D3SR] (justifying the 
Administration’s new MPP program based in part on the claim that migrants released into the 
country “disappear before an immigration judge can determine the merits of any claim”). 
20  See, e.g., Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and Unaccompanied 
Alien Children, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,486, 45,494 (proposed Sept. 7, 2018) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212, 
236; 45 C.F.R. pt. 410) (“While statistics specific to family units have not been compiled, the reality 
is that a significant number of aliens who are not in detention either fail to appear at the required 
proceedings or never actually seek asylum relief, thus remaining illegally in the United States.”); see 
also Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin K. McAleenan on the DHS-HHS Federal Rule on Flores 
Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/
08/21/acting-secretary-mcaleenan-dhs-hhs-federal-rule-flores-agreement [https://perma.cc/82YS-
V9E4] (quoting the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin K. McAleenan claiming that the 
majority of removal orders issued to families have been issued in absentia, thus benefitting those 
with “meritless claims” for asylum). 
21  See, e.g., Lei, 22 I. & N. Dec. 113, 121 (B.I.A. 1998) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“It is difficult to imagine what could be more prejudicial to a 
respondent charged with being deportable from the United States than denial of an opportunity to 
be present at his deportation hearing where he might provide any defenses to the charges against 
him, or advance any claims he may have for relief from deportation.”); Villalba-Sinaloa, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 842, 847-48 n.2 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting) (urging the majority to 
consider constitutional concerns when interpreting the statutory provision for in absentia removal). 
See generally Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial 
Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 224 (2016) (arguing that in absentia removal proceedings “may 
permit efficient processing of cases, but they do little to ensure that notice is actually received by 
migrants who may wish to appear for their hearings but lack adequate information”). 
22  Failure to appear is often treated in state court systems as a misdemeanor crime to be 
adjudicated separately from the merits of the underlying case. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2506(A)(1), (B) (2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320(a) (2019). 
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example, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, a defendant’s 
presence in court is required at the beginning of trial and cannot be waived.23 
This is very different from the immigration court system, where there is no 
protection requiring in-person appearance before commencing the trial.24 
Although much is at stake, little is actually known about how often 
immigrants come to court and the factors associated with these in absentia 
orders. President Trump and other officials offer no verifiable empirical 
support for their claims that migrants “never” or rarely come to court. 
Therefore, scholars, members of the press, and other experts have turned to 
the annual report published by the statistical division of DOJ’s Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).25 The EOIR’s annual statistical 
report has typically included a measurement of the in absentia removal rate, 
but has offered only a sparse description of the method used to reach their 
measurement.26 No independent analysis of EOIR’s method for calculating 
in absentia removal has been performed. 
This Article is the first academic study of in absentia removal orders in 
United States immigration courts.27 In it, we analyze eleven years of 
 
23  FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a); see also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993) (“The 
language, history, and logic of Rule 43 support a straightforward interpretation that prohibits the 
trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial.”). If, however, the 
defendant fails to appear after already appearing at the beginning of the trial, the trial may continue 
under certain circumstances. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c). 
24  See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
218 (2017) (explaining that unlike in criminal court, a respondent’s failure to appear in immigration 
court constitutes an “automatic loss for the noncitizen”). 
25  See generally Statistics Yearbook, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/statistical-year-book [https://perma.cc/X6GZ-BGQ4] 
(last updated Aug. 30, 2019) (containing links to Statistics Yearbooks from fiscal year 2000 through 
fiscal year 2018). Earlier “statistical summaries” were also prepared by the EOIR. See Steve Y. Koh, 
Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 430, 
431 n.4 (1991) (citing to a 1990 EOIR “Statistical Summary” that was on file at EOIR). We requested 
these statistical summaries from EOIR with a FOIA request, but were informed that EOIR’s office 
that maintains statistics was unable to find any legacy files because “the office that maintains 
statistics was not formed prior to this time and does not retain custody of reports not produced by 
them.” Letter from Joseph R. Schaaf, Senior Counsel for Admin. Law, Exec. Office for Immigration 
Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ingrid Eagly (Mar. 21, 2019) (on file with authors). 
26  We note that the EOIR’s 2018 Yearbook included measurements of total in absentia 
removals, but for the first time eliminated a calculation of the in absentia removal rate. Compare 
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK: 
FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 33 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/
YG5G-2CNC] [hereinafter EOIR 2018 YEARBOOK] (providing data on the number of in absentia 
orders issued in fiscal years 2014–2018), with EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 33 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/1107056/download [https://perma.cc/DC4B-YUDQ] [hereinafter EOIR 2017 
YEARBOOK] (reporting in absentia rates in addition to the numbers of in absentia orders). 
27  In conducting this study, we acknowledge the foundational work of other researchers. The 
pathbreaking research of Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), an independent 
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immigration court data (from fiscal years 2008–2018)28 recently made 
available to the public as part of the EOIR’s new “transparency initiative.”29 
Our analysis provides the most sophisticated statistical investigation of in 
absentia removal available, including both a critique of the limitations of 
EOIR’s statistical approach and a proposal for new methods to measure how 
often immigrants attend their court hearings. Our verifiable measurements 
debunk the claims of the current administration that immigrants “never” 
appear for their court hearings, enhance public understanding of the EOIR’s 
statistical reporting, and offer data-driven insights into the factors associated 
with court appearance. 
 
data-gathering nonprofit at Syracuse University, has made updated EOIR statistics available to the 
public and published on its website detailed reports of first impression on the prevalence of in 
absentia removal orders in specific populations, such as cases involving parents with minor 
children. See, e.g., Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta [https://perma.cc/D2KV-UVQ5] (select “Hearing 
Attendance,” “Immigration Court State,” and “Month and Year Case Began,” and click link for “Not 
Present at Last Hearing (Absentia Decision)”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (organizing in absentia 
totals by state and time period). Helpful data analysis tools on TRAC’s web page also permit users 
to count the number of in absentia removal orders in certain immigration courts (for example, 
immigration courts in California) and in certain types of cases (for example, cases involving 
juveniles). See, e.g., Priority Immigration Court Cases: Women with Children, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mwc [https://perma.cc/6THA-MWUX] (last visited Feb. 
1, 2020); Juveniles—Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://
trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile [https://perma.cc/A25A-TBZD] (last visited Feb. 1, 
2020) (laying out annual immigration court cases of juveniles from 2004 through 2019). Our project 
also benefits from research by the Catholic Legal Immigration Network and the Asylum Seeker 
Advocacy Project that provided independent analysis of the reasons why families seeking asylum 
have missed court hearings. See ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT & CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., DENIED A DAY IN COURT: THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF IN 
ABSENTIA REMOVAL ORDERS AGAINST FAMILIES SEEKING ASYLUM 16-20 (2019), 
https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Denied-a-Day-in-Court-2019-Update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96EB-CTR8] [hereinafter DENIED A DAY IN COURT] (discussing how families 
may miss court hearings in part due to lack of notice). Finally, we acknowledge the influential early 
work of the Vera Institute of Justice to study pre-trial release programs associated with increased 
appearance rates in immigration court. See EILEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 1 
TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ii, 33, 36 (2000), https://www.vera.org/publications/testing-community-
supervision-for-the-ins-an-evaluation-of-the-appearance-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/
2QGW-T6C2] (finding that roughly 90% of noncitizens who were supervised appeared in court, 
compared with 71% of nonparticipants). 
28  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/eoir [https://perma.cc/L2AV-VLYR] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (providing a link 
to download EOIR case data under the heading “EOIR Case Data”). 
29  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review Releases 
Court Statistics, Announces Transparency Initiative (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
executive-office-immigration-review-releases-court-statistics-announces-transparency [https://
perma.cc/75LJ-79QK] (explaining that the reoccurring public release of immigration court data is 
intended to increase transparency and therefore introduce accountability to the immigration 
court system). 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by summarizing the 
EOIR’s statistical presentation of data on in absentia removals. Relying 
exclusively on the numbers published in EOIR’s Statistics Yearbooks, Part I 
analyzes the choices that EOIR has made in its statistical reporting of in 
absentia removals, which it reports both in absolute numbers and as a 
percentage of initial immigration judge decisions.30 
Part II moves beyond the narrow presentation in the EOIR Yearbooks 
and engages in an original analysis of the national court data released by 
EOIR. Specifically, Part II supplements EOIR’s approach by developing two 
additional methods for measuring the in absentia rate: (1) as a percentage of 
all initial case completions (including initial immigration decisions and 
administrative closures); and (2) as a percentage of all matters (including 
initial immigration decisions, administrative closures, and pending cases). 
Administrative closure, a procedure by which a case is indefinitely removed 
from the immigration court’s active docket, reached a rate as high as one-
fourth of initial case completions during our study period.31 Pending cases 
also ballooned, reaching over 700,000 cases by the end of our study, with many 
left pending for years.32 Critically, for both cases that ended in administrative 
closure and cases that remained pending, we show that immigrants appeared 
in court when required to do so for scheduled hearings.33 If the significance 
of the in absentia rate is to measure the likelihood that immigrants comply 
with their scheduled court dates, failure to acknowledge administrative 
closures and pending cases in presenting data on in absentia decisions leaves 
gaps in our understanding of what is happening in immigration courts. 
We find that over the eleven years of our study, in absentia removals were 
18% of initial immigration judge decisions (EOIR’s standard measurement), 
but only 16% of all initial case completions, and 12% of all matters.34 We argue 
 
30  As we discuss in Part I, “initial immigration judge decision” is a term of art that the EOIR 
uses to refer to the first merits decision by the immigration judge. 
31  This statistic is based on the authors’ calculations using EOIR data. See infra Figure 1 and 
accompanying text; Table 6 and accompanying text. Under the Obama Administration, 
administrative closure increased as prosecutors exercised discretion to request closure of cases with 
strong equities that were not a priority for removal. See Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 
AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1157-59 (2015) (describing the practice of administrative closure as outlined in 
a 2011 memo that emphasized the administration’s focus on high priority cases). 
32  See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text; Table 6 and accompanying text. 
33  For purposes of our analysis, we measure whether the respondent appears at the relevant 
hearing based on whether the judge orders in absentia removal at that hearing. Under the law in 
effect during the time period of our study, judges must order a removable respondent who fails to 
appear removed in absentia unless a valid notice of the hearing was not provided. See supra text 
accompanying note 12. 
34  These measurements include all custody statuses. See infra Table 6 (“Total” calculations for 
fiscal years 2008–2018). In Part II of our Article, we focus on nondetained cases only and find that 
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that these two additional calculation methods (all completions and all 
matters) are important and capture large number of cases that are overlooked 
in the government’s statistical reporting of immigration court data. 
Our independent analysis presented in Part II also uncovers other 
evidence that enhances knowledge about the in absentia process. Notably, we 
find that 15% of the in absentia orders issued during the eleven-year period of 
our study were successfully rescinded.35 Our analysis of EOIR data suggests 
that this percentage will increase in the future as the in absentia orders issued 
in the final years of our study begin to be challenged in court. Yet 
measurements of the reopening of in absentia orders are not included in any 
government reporting on in absentia removal. 
Part III proceeds further by exploring the relationship between in absentia 
removal decisions and three important factors: attorney representation, filing 
of claims for relief, and court location. We find a strong relationship between 
each of these three factors and the in absentia removal rate. Individuals who 
filed claims for relief (such as asylum or cancellation of removal) are very 
unlikely to miss court: 95% attended all of their court hearings over the eleven 
years of our study in pending and completed nondetained cases.36 Those who 
obtained lawyers also almost always came to court: 96% attended all court 
hearings in pending and completed nondetained cases since 2008.37 In 
addition, the prevalence of in absentia removal varied widely based on court 
location, ranging from a low of 15% of initial case completions in New York 
City, to a high of 54% in Harlingen, Texas.38 These and other findings have 
meaningful policy implications, which we explore in the Conclusion. 
I. EOIR’S MEASUREMENTS 
Each year, EOIR publishes a Statistics Yearbook that contains a limited 
amount of information about in absentia removal.39 To date, this information 
 
in absentia removals were 34% of initial immigration judges’ decisions, 27% of all completions, and 
17% of all matters. See infra Table 7 (“Total” calculations for fiscal years 2008–2018). 
35  See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018) (providing that following a 
motion to reopen a case, an in absentia removal order may be rescinded if the respondent’s failure to 
appear was due to exceptional circumstances or the respondent did not receive adequate notice). 
36  See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
37  See infra Figure 3. 
38  This variation in jurisdictional in absentia rate is measured among the twenty-five most 
active base city jurisdictions. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text. 
39  Statistics Yearbooks dating back to fiscal year 2000 are publicly available on the EOIR web 
page. See Statistics Yearbook, supra note 25 (linking to Statistics Yearbooks from fiscal years 2000–
2018). Prior to fiscal year 2013, the Yearbook was called the “Statistical Year Book,” but the name has 
now been changed to the “Statistics Yearbook.” Compare EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2013), https://www.justice.gov/
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has been the only available government publication on in absentia orders in 
immigration courts. These published statistics are widely cited by the press,40 
academics,41 nonprofits and think tanks,42 and lawmakers.43 
EOIR has consistently presented three different data points on in absentia 
removals. First, it publishes the total number of in absentia removal orders 
issued each year.44 Second, it measures the overall “rate” of in absentia removal 
among both detained and nondetained respondents. Third, because in absentia 
orders are rare in detention,45 it provides measurements for the in absentia 
rate in nondetained cases, a population that includes both individuals who 
were never detained and those who were detained at some point but released 
from detention.46 In this Part, we reproduce these numbers from EOIR’s 
Statistics Yearbook in order to familiarize readers with what these numbers 
measure. Later, in Part II, we build on EOIR’s analysis and introduce 
alternative methods for measuring in absentia removal. 
A. Counting In Absentia Removal Orders 
The EOIR Statistics Yearbook reports the total number of in absentia 
removal orders issued by immigration judges each fiscal year. EOIR 
categorizes immigration court cases based on the type of immigration 
question under review by the judge, including removal, credible fear review, 
 
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/04/fy12syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL8D-XMWQ] [hereinafter 
EOIR 2012 YEARBOOK], with EOIR 2018 YEARBOOK, supra note 26. 
40  See, e.g., Nolan Rappaport, Trump’s Fast-Tracked Deportations May Be Only Solution to 
Backlog, THE HILL (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/356211-
trumps-fast-tracked-deportations-may-be-only-practical-solution-to [https://perma.cc/24T8-W6AM] 
(citing data from the 2016 Statistics Yearbook). 
41  See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 21, at 159-60 & nn.5-6 (citing data from the 2015 Statistics Yearbook). 
42  See, e.g., JEANNE BATALOVA, ANDRIY SHYMONYAK & MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION DATA MATTERS 16 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
immigration-data-matters [https://perma.cc/6TUL-RYE5] (pointing readers to EOIR Statistics 
Yearbooks for further information concerning immigration proceedings). 
43  See, e.g., Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied Children 
and Related Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 119 (2017) (answer of 
Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice) (citing 
the 2013 Statistics Yearbook). 
44  Technically, EOIR only includes in the Yearbooks the number of in absentia removal orders 
issued at the initial case completion stage. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
45  As we explain, infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, immigration judges have ordered 
in absentia removal for respondents held in United States custody, despite the fact that doing so 
raises due process issues given that respondents in detention are dependent on the government to 
transport them to the scheduled hearing. 
46  EOIR also included measurements for in absentia removals in asylum cases and UAC cases 
in its 2017 Yearbook. EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 33-34. We analyze asylum cases in 
Part III of this Article. 
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and reasonable fear review.47 According to EOIR, 223,498 out of 237,000 cases 
received by the immigration courts in 2016 were for removal, making removal 
by far the dominant type of case.48 Removal cases require the judge to make 
a decision whether to deport someone from the United States, or instead to 
grant the individual relief to remain in the United States.49 EOIR’s 
accounting of in absentia orders is not limited to removal cases, but instead 
includes in absentia orders issued in all case types.50 
 Beginning in fiscal year 2013, EOIR adopted an “initial case completion” 
method for its statistical reporting, and backdated this approach to fiscal year 
2009.51 This method continued in EOIR’s statistical reporting through fiscal 
year 2016.52 EOIR defines an “initial case” as “[t]he proceeding that begins 
when the Department of Homeland Security files a charging document with 
an immigration court and ends when an immigration judge renders a 
determination.”53 Although many immigration cases do end with the initial 
 
47  EOIR reports eleven different case types. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK B2 & tbl.4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/fysb16/download [https://perma.cc/VT6Z-P5UM] [hereinafter EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK] 
(listing different “case types”). 
48  Id. at B1 & tbl.3. 
49  See infra notes 200–206 and accompanying text (describing the two-stage process of 
removal proceedings). 
50  See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (defining immigration court matters to 
include all case types); id. at P1 (reporting the number of in absentia orders out of all initial case 
completions for all case types). 
51  EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9 (page preceding Table of Contents) (“[I]n an effort 
to clarify the agency’s workload, EOIR has changed the methodology for counting matters received 
and matters completed, which will affect the appearance of those numbers in the Statistics 
Yearbook.”). Prior to fiscal year 2013, EOIR counted both initial and subsequent proceedings and 
therefore created less clarity about the status of the court’s workload. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven 
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 n.74 (2015) 
(discussing EOIR’s shift from a proceeding-level analysis to an initial case completion approach). 
52  Beginning with the 2017 Yearbook, EOIR made two changes to reported statistics on initial 
case completions and in absentia orders. First, EOIR began to focus solely on “I-862” case types, 
meaning just removal, deportation, and exclusion case types. Compare EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, 
supra note 26, at 7 (defining the I-862 case types used for initial case completions and in absentia 
orders), with EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (defining immigration court matters to 
include all case types). Second, EOIR redefined initial case completions to exclude administrative 
closures. Compare EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 7 (“Initial Case Completion (ICC) is 
the first dispositive decision rendered by an immigration judge . . . . An order . . . administratively 
closing a case is not a dispositive decision and, thus, does not constitute a case completion.”), with 
EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A1 (“Immigration court completions include immigration 
judge decisions and other completions (such as administrative closings) . . . .”). More recently 
published statistics on initial case completions are therefore not comparable. Compare, e.g., EOIR 
2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C2 (listing 137,875 initial case completions for fiscal year 2016), 
with EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 10 (listing just 128,201 initial case completions for 
fiscal year 2016). 
53  EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 7. Under this approach, EOIR 
does not count decisions to change venue or transfer a case as an initial case completion. 
2020] Measuring In Absentia Removal 829 
case completion, some cases continue onto what EOIR calls a “subsequent 
case completion,” such as when a case is remanded after appeal or reopened 
by the immigration judge.54 
 
Table 1: EOIR Reporting of In Absentia Removal at the  
Initial Case Completion Stage, by Fiscal Year  
(2009–2016) (All Custody Status)55 
Fiscal Year Number Change (%) 
2009 23,269 — 
2010 25,059 +8 
2011 22,567 -10 
2012 19,449 -14 
2013 21,493 +11 
2014 26,131 +22 
2015 38,329 +47 
2016 34,268 -11 
 
Table 1 reproduces the numbers provided in the EOIR Statistics 
Yearbooks for in absentia removal orders issued by immigration judges at the 
initial case completion stage from 2009 to 2016. As seen in Table 1, the annual 
number of in absentia orders fluctuated from year to year, decreasing in some 
years while increasing in others. During this period, in absentia removals 
reached a low of 19,449 in 2012 and a high of 38,329 in 2015.56 
B. Calculating the In Absentia Removal Rate 
The discussion thus far has presented the annual number of in absentia removal 
orders issued each year, as reported by EOIR. But what was the in absentia removal 
rate—that is, the percentage of cases that ended in an in absentia removal order? 
Since EOIR adopted its initial case completion approach with the 2013 
Statistics Yearbook, it has measured the in absentia rate by dividing the 
 
54  EOIR defines a “subsequent case” as a proceeding “that begins when: 1) the immigration 
judge grants a motion to reopen, reconsider, or recalendar; or 2) the Board of Immigration Appeals 
issues a decision to remand and ends when the immigration judge renders a determination.” Id., 
Glossary of Terms at 11. 
55  Table 1 relies on the in absentia removals reported by EOIR in its Statistics Yearbooks for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2016 at the initial case completion stage. We selected fiscal years 2009 
through 2016 for analysis because EOIR used a consistent method for measuring initial case 
completions in these publications. See supra note 52. We obtained these data for fiscal years 2012 to 
2016 from the 2016 Yearbook and added data for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, unavailable in the 2016 
Yearbook, from the 2013 Yearbook. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1; EOIR 2016 
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1. 
56  EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1. 
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number of in absentia removals issued at the initial case completion stage by 
the total number of initial immigration judge decisions issued during the 
fiscal year.57 EOIR defines an initial immigration judge decision as the first 
dispositive decision issued by the immigration judge in a case.58 Immigration 
judges have a number of ways to dispose of a case on the merits: they may 
order removal, grant relief from removal, or terminate the case. As already 
established, removal decisions may be issued in absentia or with the individual 
present in court (not in absentia). 
 
  
 
57  See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1 (calculating the “in absentia rate” as the 
percentage of initial immigration judge completions that end in in absentia removal); see also EXEC. 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK 
P1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8DF-4JVS]; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK P1 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/
fysb15/download [https://perma.cc/WH27-CH6J]; EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1. 
Note that while the EOIR 2017 Yearbook uses a similar approach, EOIR narrowed its definition of 
relevant case types and its calculation of relevant immigration judge completions. See supra note 52. 
58  See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C1 (“In rendering a decision, the immigration 
judge may order the alien removed from the United States, grant some form of relief, or terminate 
the case.”). In some cases, there is a subsequent case decision after this initial decision. See id. at A8 
fig.3. Subsequent decisions are not analyzed in EOIR’s in absentia measurements and are not 
presented here. See id. at P1-P4. 
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Table 2: In Absentia Removals as a Percentage of Initial Immigration Judge 
Decisions, by Fiscal Year (2009–2016) (All Custody Status)59 
 Initial Immigration Judge Decisions  
Fiscal Year In Absentia Not In Absentia 
EOIR 
In Absentia Rate 
2009 23,269 193,039 11% 
2010 25,059 181,099 12% 
2011 22,567 180,141 11% 
2012 19,449 150,495 11% 
2013 21,493 120,822 15% 
2014 26,131 109,456 19% 
2015 38,329 100,081 28% 
2016 34,268 103,607 25% 
Summary Statistics   
Total 210,565 1,138,740 16% 
Average 
(SD) 
26,321 
(6,578) 
142,343 
(38,542) 
16% 
(6%) 
 
Table 2 presents EOIR’s calculations of the in absentia rate, using data 
published in the EOIR Statistics Yearbooks. The second column (labeled “In 
Absentia”) reproduces the annual totals of in absentia orders that were 
presented in Table 1. The third column (labeled “Not In Absentia”) contains 
the number of initial immigration judge decisions that were not issued in 
absentia. The final column presents EOIR’s in absentia removal rate—the 
percentage of all initial immigration judge decisions that were issued in 
absentia. Over the period measured, the rate varied from a low of 11% in 2009 
to a high of 28% in 2015.60 Over the entire period for which data is available 
in the EOIR Yearbooks (2009–2016), the aggregate and average in absentia 
rate using EOIR’s initial immigration judge decision method were 16%. 
 
59  Table 3 relies on the 2013 and 2016 Yearbooks’ reporting of in absentia removal orders and 
the in absentia rate. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1-P4; EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra 
note 47, at P1-P4. Based on these raw numbers, we also display total and average immigration judge 
decisions and in absentia rates, statistics that are not presented in EOIR Yearbooks. For the purposes 
of calculating the average EOIR in absentia removal rate, means were weighted by the total number 
of cases in each year. 
60  We note that during this time period the overall number of initial immigration judge 
decisions declined, a topic with important structural implications for measuring in absentia removal. 
See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text. 
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C. Custody Status 
EOIR’s annual publications provide one additional data point for 
understanding how in absentia orders are distributed: custody status. In 
immigration court, there are three different possible custody statuses. First, 
some individuals are detained throughout their entire case.61 Second, some 
individuals are detained but later released from custody on bond or on their 
own recognizance.62 Third, some individuals are never detained at any point 
during their case.63  
As reported in the EOIR Yearbooks and summarized in Table 3, the lion’s 
share of in absentia removal orders (69%) were issued to individuals who were 
never subjected to detention. An additional 30% of in absentia removal orders 
were issued to those who were released from detention on bond or on their 
own recognizance.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61  Individuals who were detained throughout their removal cases comprised 50% (n = 670,586) 
of the 1,349,305 initial immigration judge decisions in the EOIR Yearbooks from fiscal year 2009 to 
2016. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P4 (providing the total number of immigration 
judge decisions for fiscal years 2009–2011 and the total number of immigration judge decisions 
for nondetained respondents for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1, 
P4 (providing the total number of immigration judge decisions for fiscal years 2012–2016 and the total 
number of immigration judge decisions for nondetained respondents for fiscal years 2012–2016). For 
essential background on how detention has been used to control U.S. borders, see Lenni B. Benson, 
As Old As the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11 (2010). 
62  Individuals who were released from custody comprised 14% (n = 192,184) of the 1,349,305 
initial case completions in the EOIR Yearbooks from fiscal year 2009 to 2016. EOIR 2013 
YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P3 (for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 
47, at P1, P3 (for fiscal years 2012–2016). 
63  The term “never detained” means that EOIR has no record of the individual being detained 
during the pendency of the removal case. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms 
at 8. According to statistics published in the EOIR Yearbooks, 36% (n = 486,535) of the 1,349,305 
initial immigration judge decisions from fiscal year 2009 to 2016 were of individuals who were never 
detained. EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1, P2 (for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1, P2 (for fiscal years 2012–2016). We acknowledge, however, that 
some individuals who were never detained during their removal case may have been detained at 
some point by immigration authorities. 
64  For a more detailed discussion of the process of release from immigration court on bond, 
see Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2016). 
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Table 3: In Absentia Removal Orders Among Initial Immigration Judge 
Decisions, by Custody Status and Fiscal Year (2009–2016)65 
Fiscal Year Never Detained Released Detained Total 
2009 18,710 4,189 370 23,269 
2010 20,458 4,199 402 25,059 
2011 15,710 6,557 300 22,567 
2012 11,676 7,689 84 19,449 
2013 12,053 9,349 91 21,493 
2014 15,357 10,656 118 26,131 
2015 26,912 11,346 71 38,329 
2016 24,471 9,722 75 34,268 
Total 145,347 63,707 1,511 210,565 
 
A small number of in absentia orders involved individuals in detention. As 
seen in Table 3, 1,511 in absentia orders were issued in detention between 2009 
and 2016. Surprisingly, these in absentia orders occurred despite the fact that 
individuals were in detention and reliant on the government to transport 
them to their hearings. According to EOIR’s statistics division, these in 
absentia orders were generally issued when the detained respondent was 
unable to come to immigration court “because of illness or transportation 
problems.”66 The annual number of in absentia orders in detention has 
declined in recent years and since 2015 has been fewer than one hundred 
orders per year.67 The issuance of in absentia orders to detainees who were not 
transported to their hearings or deemed too ill to attend raises serious due 
process questions and should be the subject of future study.68 
In Table 4, we summarize the data published by EOIR in its Statistics 
Yearbooks to calculate the overall in absentia removal rate (among initial 
immigration judge decisions) for never-detained and released respondents. 
 
65  Table 3 relies on the 2013 and 2016 Yearbooks’ reporting of in absentia removal orders for 
both never-detained and released respondents. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P1-P3 
(for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P1-P3 (for fiscal years 2012–
2016). The EOIR Yearbooks do not publish in absentia numbers for detained respondents, but we 
were able to calculate those amounts by subtracting the totals for “never detained” and “released” in 
absentia removals from the overall published totals. See supra note 61. 
66  See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2003 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H2 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/
04/18/fy03syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Y8-V5QU] (“Failures to appear for detained cases occur very 
infrequently, generally only because of illness or transportation problems.”). 
67  See supra Table 3. 
68  Cf. Evra, 25 I. & N. Dec. 79, 79-80 (B.I.A. 2009) (allowing a noncitizen ordered removed 
in absentia while in state custody to seek rescission of that removal order because the failure to appear 
had been “through no fault of the alien”). For an argument that detention should be abolished, see 
CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION 
WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 139-63 (2019). 
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As seen in Table 4, EOIR’s in absentia rate fluctuated from year to year and 
was generally somewhat lower for individuals who were never detained (30% 
from 2009 to 2016), compared to those who were released from custody on 
bond or on their own recognizance (33%). 
 
Table 4: In Absentia Removal Rate as Calculated by EOIR,  
by Custody Status and Fiscal Year (2009–2016)69 
 Never Detained Released 
 Initial IJ Decisions  Initial IJ Decisions  
Fiscal 
Year 
In  
Absentia 
Not In 
Absentia 
EOIR In 
Absentia Rate 
In  
Absentia 
Not In 
Absentia 
EOIR In 
Absentia Rate 
2009 18,710 46,773 29% 4,189 13,605 24% 
2010 20,458 52,502 28% 4,199 15,087 22% 
2011 15,710 52,154 23% 6,557 16,666 28% 
2012 11,676 44,972 21% 7,689 17,256 31% 
2013 12,053 40,502 23% 9,349 18,457 34% 
2014 15,357 32,613 32% 10,656 16,381 39% 
2015 26,912 34,026 44% 11,346 15,983 42% 
2016 24,471 37,646 39% 9,722 15,042 39% 
Summary Statistics 
Total 145,347 341,188 30% 63,707 128,477 33% 
Average 
(SD) 
18,168 
(5,545) 
42,649 
(7,696) 
30% 
(8%) 
7,963 
(2,782) 
16,060 
(1,496) 
33% 
(7%) 
 
Given that in absentia removal in detention is so rare, EOIR is correct to 
also provide calculations of in absentia removal by custody status. Doing so 
provides a more complete picture of how often these orders are issued by 
judges. Yet EOIR is only using one method—the initial immigration judge 
 
69  All raw data used for the calculations in Table 4 were obtained from the EOIR Yearbooks. 
See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at P2-P3 (for fiscal years 2009–2011); EOIR 2016 
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at P2-P3 (for fiscal years 2012–2016). The columns labeled “EOIR In 
Absentia Rate” in Table 4 calculate the in absentia removal rate using EOIR’s measurement of in 
absentia removals as a percentage of initial immigration judge (IJ) decisions. Table 4, like the EOIR 
Yearbooks, does not include data on detained cases because the in absentia numbers are too low for 
meaningful display. See supra Table 3. Based on the raw numbers of immigration judge decisions 
published in the Yearbooks, Table 4 also calculates the total and average immigration judge 
decisions and in absentia rates, statistics that are not presented in EOIR’s Yearbooks. For the 
purposes of the average EOIR in absentia removal rate, means were weighted by the total number 
of cases in each year. 
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decision approach. As we develop in Part II, this choice in method presents a 
limited view of the patterns in immigration courts. 
II. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR MEASURING 
IN ABSENTIA REMOVAL 
Part I introduced the basic statistics on in absentia removal presented by 
EOIR in its statistical reports. In Part II, we analyze in more detail the 
decisions that EOIR made in calculating the prevalence of in absentia removal 
in the immigration courts and develop alternative methods for measuring in 
absentia removal that we believe improve the overall understanding of how 
and when these orders occur in immigration courts. 
We approach this task by analyzing the EOIR court data used to create 
the EOIR Statistics Yearbooks. However, unlike in Part I where we simply 
presented the numbers published in the Yearbooks, in Part II we conduct our 
own original analysis. We begin by describing our preparation of the EOIR 
data for analysis. 
A. EOIR Court Data 
We obtained the data for analysis directly from EOIR. As of July 2018, 
rather than requiring a written request under the Freedom of Information 
Act, EOIR began making its full database of immigration court data available 
on its web page for the public to download and analyze.70 EOIR periodically 
updates these data, and we analyzed data tables made available by EOIR as 
of November 2, 2018. These data included 8,253,223 immigration court 
proceedings, with completed and pending cases dating back to 1951.71 
Each of these immigration court proceedings contains one or more 
hearings. Immigration hearings categorized as “individual” hearings (also 
 
70  According to the “EOIR Case Data” section on EOIR’s homepage: 
In 2008, EOIR began receiving requests from a university-affiliated data clearinghouse 
for large, raw data files from the agency’s case file electronic database. As EOIR has 
received at least three FOIA requests for this information, the FOIA Improvement 
Act of 2016 requires the agency to make the records available for public inspection in 
an electronic format.  
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir 
[https://perma.cc/86LC-GVMH] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
71  We found no indications of reliability issues in the data we analyzed (through November 
2, 2018) beyond common and correctible errors in data formatting (for example, extraneous tabs 
moving data over a column). EOIR has been criticized, however, for its handling of more recent 
data provided to the public. See Incomplete and Garbled Immigration Court Data Suggest Lack of 
Commitment to Accuracy, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Oct. 31, 2019), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/580 [https://perma.cc/RW26-GSL7] (finding gaps in EOIR’s data verification procedures 
that led to the release of unreliable data for September 2019). 
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commonly known as “merits” hearings) are scheduled for an immigration 
judge to adjudicate the substance of the respondent’s claim (for example, 
asylum or cancellation of removal).72 All other hearings are generally referred 
to as “initial master” hearings (also commonly known as “master calendar” 
hearings), which are scheduled to allow for general administration of the cases 
(including, for example, the taking of pleadings, requests for time to find an 
attorney or time to prepare a case, and the filing of applications for relief).73 
To conduct our analysis, we first limited these data to those cases with an 
initial immigration judge completion occurring between fiscal years 2008 and 
2018.74 We chose 2008 as the start date for our analysis in order to limit our 
analysis to EOIR data entered into the agency’s Case Access System for 
EOIR (CASE), which was adopted in 2006 and was phased in through 2007.75 
In total, our data contained 3,945,781 immigration court proceedings from the 
eleven-year period between 2008 and 2018.76 
We next limited our sample to the 3,852,745 removal proceedings in our 
data.77 As mentioned in Part I, removal is by far the most common proceeding 
 
72  See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 86 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1084851/download 
[https://perma.cc/57QL-C32K] [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL] 
(defining “individual calendar hearings” as “[e]videntiary hearings on contested matters”). In our 
data, very few cases of in absentia removal (7%) occurred at an individual hearing scheduled to 
address the merits of a respondent’s claim (n = 22,877 of 315,780 total in absentia removals). 
73   See id. at 73-79 (describing the purposes of master calendar hearings). 
74   The federal government’s fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 
of the following year. See, e.g., Federal Budgets by Year, U.S. GOV’T PUBLISHING OFFICE, 
https://bookstore.gpo.gov/taxonomy/term/779/fiscal-year-2017-budget [https://perma.cc/3L4N-
UUS2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
75  See NINA SIULC ET. AL, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: 
EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 74-75 
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/LOPEvaluation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9YT-
53CG] (discussing the 2006–2007 transition to CASE from the earlier case management system, 
known as ANSIR); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Privacy Impact 
Assessment: Case Access System for EOIR 2 (Sept. 14, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/opcl/docs/eoir_pia.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B7L-277S] (explaining that the then-new CASE 
system “will integrate the stove-piped legacy databases for the Immigration Courts and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals”). Using the Freedom of Information Act, we have gathered and reviewed 
training manuals and reference guides prepared for training judges and court administrators on 
how to use the CASE system. Ingrid V. Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: 
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention—Online Appendix, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW: HUGH AND 
HAZEL DARLING LAW LIBRARY, https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/detainingfamilies [https://
perma.cc/8ZZS-KEYU] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
76   If no initial immigration judge completion had occurred between 2008 and 2018, we still 
included the case if the first scheduled hearing occurred during or after fiscal year 2008. Initial 
immigration judge completions include both merits immigration judge decisions and all other 
completions (for example, administrative closures). 
77   The term “removal proceeding” has been in use since 1997 and refers to immigration court 
cases for excluding a person seeking to enter the U.S. or deporting a person who is already 
present in the United States. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45-46 (2011) (describing the 
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type, constituting 98% of the 3,945,781 proceedings between 2008 and 2018.78 
Because an individual immigration case may have more than one proceeding, 
these 3,852,745 removal proceedings comprised 2,732,988 unique immigration 
cases.79 These cases include all custody statuses: never detained, released, and 
detained.80 We call this analytical sample the All Custody Removal Sample. 
Next, we created a Nondetained Removal Sample, which we limited to 
individuals who were not detained at the time of their initial case completion. 
This sample includes individuals who were never detained, as well as those 
who were detained at some point, but later released from custody. Our 
Nondetained Removal Sample contains 2,797,437 removal proceedings 
comprising 1,829,049 unique immigration cases. 
B. The Changing Immigration Court Docket 
EOIR chooses to measure the in absentia removal rate based on the narrow 
pool of immigration judge decisions.81 This approach, however, overlooks the 
increasing stream of other immigration judge completions (for example, 
 
change in language that accompanied 1996 amendments to federal immigration law, which 
folded “exclusion proceeding[s]” and “deportation proceeding[s]” into “a unified procedure, known as 
a ‘removal proceeding’”). 
78   Immigration courts also handled other types of proceedings during this period, including 
credible fear review, reasonable fear review, claimed status review, asylum only, and withholding 
only. See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at B1. The EOIR data also included bond 
redetermination proceedings that occurred before a document called a “notice to appear” was filed, 
known as “zero bond” cases. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, UNIFORM SYSTEM DOCKETING MANUAL I-11 (2013), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/
ld.php?content_id=38100361 [https://perma.cc/3ZNN-C9UB] (explaining that bond redetermination 
requests “are separate from the removal hearing process that begins with the filing of the Notice to 
Appear at the Immigration Court”). We removed these zero bond proceedings from all analyses. 
79   For cases with a 2008 initial case completion, we included any earlier non-initial case 
completions that occurred before 2008 (for example, transfer). We counted as pending those cases 
completed in fiscal year 2019 (that is, those that were completed between October 1, 2018, and 
November 2, 2018, when the data were made available). 
80  Each immigration court proceeding is classified by EOIR with one of three codes for 
custody status. See EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 5 (defining “Custody 
Status” as “[w]hether or not an alien is detained” and defining the three custody statuses identified 
within the Yearbook). In the EOIR data we analyzed, a detained respondent is coded as “D.” A 
respondent who is initially detained but later released—on bond or some alternative type of 
condition—is coded as “R.” Finally, if EOIR has no record of a respondent ever having been 
detained, the code “N” is used. Some respondents in our sample had multiple custody statuses over 
the course of several proceedings. In these instances, we classified the in absentia removal order based 
on the custody status at the time that the in absentia removal order was issued. 
81   As explained earlier and developed further in this Section, an “immigration judge decision” 
is defined by EOIR as the first dispositive decision in a removal case and includes removal, 
termination, or relief. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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administrative closures) and pending cases on the court’s docket.82 These 
additional categories of cases, we argue, must be considered when addressing 
whether immigrants are engaged in the court process. Determining how to 
measure the in absentia removal rate, then, first requires familiarity with the 
categories of cases that flow through the immigration court. 
As discussed in Part I, immigration judge decisions are decisions on the 
merits to order removal, grant relief, or terminate the case. Yet immigration 
judge decisions are not the only way that immigration court cases are 
adjudicated. Administrative closure is a discretionary docket-management tool 
that immigration judges have used for decades.83 Through this practice, a judge 
removes a case from the active docket, thereby putting the case on indefinite 
hold and allowing the noncitizen to remain in the United States.84 EOIR does 
not, however, include administrative closures in its in absentia calculations.  
By far the largest category of immigration court cases today are pending 
cases.85 Pending cases are not yet resolved and have ongoing hearings to rule 
on motions and applications for relief. Were immigration cases quickly 
decided on their merits, excluding pending cases when measuring the in 
absentia rate as EOIR does might make sense. But given the immense and 
 
82  As we explain in this Section, cases that are administratively closed by the immigration 
judge are not considered by EOIR to have reached an “immigration judge decision.” See infra notes 
91–92 and accompanying text.  
83  Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors 
and Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff, Operating Policies and Procedures 
Memorandum 13-01: Continuances and Administrative Closure 3 (Mar. 7, 2013), https://
libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258569 [https://perma.cc/643J-CE6J]. 
84  Id. at 2 (instructing immigration judges to grant requests for administrative closure “in 
appropriate circumstances”); see also IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 72, 
Glossary at 1 (2017) (“Once a case has been administratively closed, the court will not take any action 
on the case until a request to recalendar is filed by one of the parties.”). In 2018, the Attorney General 
issued a decision to greatly restrict the practice of administrative closure. Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018). However, on August 29, 2019, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals abrogated 
Castro-Tum, finding that the immigration law unambiguously permits immigration judges to control 
their own dockets. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 286, 292-94 (4th Cir. 2019). 
85 See infra Figure 1. In 2017, immigration courts in some jurisdictions began to create “status 
dockets” to monitor cases in which respondents are pursuing relief outside of immigration court. See 
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: SEEKING 
CONTINUANCES IN IMMIGRATION COURT IN THE WAKE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DECISION 
IN MATTER OF L-A-B-R 39 (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/removal-proceedings/practice-
advisory-matter-l-b-r-27-dec-405-ag-2018 [https://perma.cc/U6VH-3YAX]. Only recently has 
EOIR published guidance on status dockets. Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review, to All Immigration Court Personnel, Policy Memorandum 19-13: 
Use of Status Dockets (Aug. 16, 2019), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=51480401 
[https://perma.cc/86UF-UKN3]. Given how new this practice is and the jurisdictional variation in its 
implementation, we do not analyze status dockets in this Article. 
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growing backlog in the immigration courts,86 cases can drag on for many years 
before a decision is reached.87 Additionally, as we will discuss, the data suggest 
that immigrants are engaged in the court process as their cases wind their way 
through the long court process. 
Relying on the All Custody Removal Sample, we investigate these 
changes to the immigration court docket. Figure 1 depicts trends in immigration 
court cases over the past eleven years. Understanding these different case trends 
is fundamental to identifying how best to measure in absentia removal. 
The first category of cases included in Figure 1 is immigration judge 
decisions. We separate immigration judge decisions into two categories: those 
issued in absentia and those not issued in absentia. The lower dashed line 
(labeled “IJ Decisions (In Absentia)”) measures the annual number of in 
absentia removal orders issued in the initial immigration judge completion 
stage of the case. The solid line (labeled “IJ Decisions (Not In Absentia)”) 
tracks the initial immigration judge decisions made by immigration judges 
that were not issued in absentia. Cases ending with a decision not in absentia 
include both individuals who were ordered removed and those who obtained 
relief.88 One crucial observation from Figure 1 is that initial immigration 
judge decisions (the total issued in absentia and not in absentia) have declined 
from 206,538 in 2008 to 169,174 in 2018, with a low of 120,414 in 2016. That 
is, despite growing caseloads, immigration judges are much less likely to reach 
an on-the-merits decision today than they were eleven years ago. 
 
86  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT 
AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf [https://
perma.cc/54GQ-LE2C] (finding that EOIR’s case backlog more than doubled between fiscal years 
2006 and 2015). 
87   In our data, new immigration court dates for nondetained cases were set out as late as 2025. 
88  Eighty-two percent of the initial immigration judge decisions in our data were not in 
absentia (n = 1,471,662 of 1,789,834). Of these non-in absentia decisions, 58% of respondents were 
ordered removed (n = 848,979), 16% obtained relief (n = 231,646), and 14% were granted voluntary 
departure (n = 210,997). The remaining 12% received termination, prosecutorial discretion, or other 
merits outcomes (n = 180,040). 
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Figure 1: Case Trends in Immigration Court, by Fiscal Year 
(2008–2018) (All Custody Status)89 
A second case type shown in Figure 1 are those that are not decided on 
their merits, a category that EOIR has referred to as “other completions.”90
During our study period, 96% of “other completions” (n = 226,130 of 236,007) 
were administrative closures.91 Other completions also include a few cases 
resulting in failure to prosecute and temporary protected status.92 
89 Figure 1 presents fiscal year totals for removal cases, including both detained and 
nondetained cases. These completions include initial immigration decisions (that is, on the merits) and 
other immigration judge completions (for example, administrative closures). Changes of venue or transfers 
are not counted by EOIR as an initial case completion. We excluded from pending calculations cases that 
became pending after the initial completion (for example, a case recalendared after an administrative 
completion that is still pending), and therefore our estimates of pending cases are conservative. 
90 See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C5 (“Cases that are not decided on their
merits are classified as other completions.”). Almost all other completions (n = 225,198 of 236,007 
total completions) during our study period involved individuals who were not detained at the time 
of the judge’s decision to close the case.
91  During the time period of our study, administrative closure was understood by the 
immigration courts as “a legitimate method of removing a case from the court’s active docket” and 
“preserving limited administrative resources.” See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, supra note 
83, at 2 (providing “guidance to assist immigration judges with fair and efficient docket management 
practices related to . . . requests for administrative closures and continuances”). We note that in the 
2017 Statistics Yearbook, EOIR discontinued referring to administrative closures as “initial case 
completions.” See EOIR 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 7 (“An order . . . administratively closing 
a case is not a dispositive decision and, thus, does not constitute a case completion.”). 
92 Other completions are defined in the data by the decision type entry “O” in the “DecType” 
field. For these other completions, the detailed decision is found by matching the proceeding decision 
code (“DecCode”) with the detailed description (“DecDescription”) in the “tblLookupCourtDecision” 
lookup table provided by EOIR.
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The lower dotted line in Figure 1 (labeled “Other IJ Completions”) contains 
these “other completions.”93 As seen in Figure 1, after years of steady increases, 
other completions reached a high of 47,877 in 2016, but began to decline after 
President Trump was elected.94 In a controversial decision issued at the end of 
our study period in 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions ruled that 
immigration judges lacked authority to administratively close cases unless 
specifically provided for by a regulation or an existing settlement agreement.95 
A third case type of growing importance is pending cases. The top short-
dashed line of Figure 1 (labeled “Pending Cases”) shows the skyrocketing 
number of pending cases in immigration courts. The number of such cases 
has increased by more than 350%, from 156,714 pending cases in 2008 to 
707,147 in 2018. Of these 707,147 pending cases, 673,576 involved individuals 
who were never detained or released from custody. 
The similarities and differences among these categories of cases—
immigration judge decisions issued in absentia, immigration judge decisions 
issued not in absentia, other immigration judge completions (for example, 
administrative closures), and pending cases—provides necessary context for 
deciding how to measure in absentia removal. We first note that initial 
immigration judge decisions issued in absentia have several distinct 
characteristics. As seen in Table 5, while only 15% of those removed in absentia 
had attorneys, 86% of those who were not removed in absentia at the time of 
the immigration judge decision had attorneys.96 While only 14% of those 
removed in absentia had filed an application for relief from removal (such as 
 
93  In order to count each case only once, our measurements of other completions do not 
include decisions to transfer a case or change venue. We note that prior to 2013 EOIR included 
transfers and changes of venue in its count of “other completions.” See EOIR 2012 YEARBOOK, supra 
note 39, at D1 (“Administrative closures and cases transferred to a different hearing location or 
granted a change of venue are counted as ‘other completions.’”); see also id. at D3 & fig.6 (including 
“Transfer” and “Change of Venue” completions in the total count of “Other Completions by 
Disposition”). However, beginning in 2013, EOIR changed its method for calculating other 
completions to eliminate the large category of cases that ended in transfer or change of venue. See 
EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, at C4 & fig.6. 
94  For a compelling critique of the growing White House influence over the decisionmaking 
of immigration courts, see Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 
1, 34-48 (2018). 
95  Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 271 (A.G. 2018). But see Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 
294-97 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Castro-Tum is unambiguously contrary to the federal 
immigration law). 
96  We measured representation by whether a Notice of Entry of Appearance Form (known as 
a “Form EOIR-28”) was filed in the case. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. For cases 
that reached initial case completion, we counted the respondent as represented if the form was 
filed on or before the date of the case completion. If the EOIR-28 was filed after the initial case 
completion, we still counted the individual as represented if an attorney appeared in one or more 
hearings in the relevant proceeding. We followed this same method in an earlier article. See Eagly 
& Shafer, supra note 51, at 79-80. 
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asylum), 63% of those present in court at the time of the immigration decision 
filed an application for relief from removal.97 
An additional key difference between cases that ended in absentia and 
those that did not is in the total case time and number of hearings. As seen 
in Table 5, cases ending with in absentia removal were completed in a median 
of 218 days, much faster than the median of 583 days for immigration judge 
decisions that did not end in absentia.98 The speed of in absentia cases, as Table 
5 also highlights, means that they are concluded in fewer hearings. While in 
absentia cases had a median of only two hearings, cases that did not end in 
absentia had a median of four hearings. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Case Types  
(2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)99 
 IJ Decisions   
 
In  
Absentia 
Not In 
Absentia 
Other IJ 
Completions Pending 
Represented 15% 86% 85% 67% 
Application for Relief 14% 63% 52% 57% 
    
Case Length    
180 days or more 56% 87% 86% 81% 
Median days 218 583 667 600 
Mean days 
(SD) 
362 
(424) 
736 
(591) 
798 
(617) 
803 
(698) 
Total (N) 316,089 614,182 225,198 673,580 
    
Number of Court Hearings    
4 or more hearings 17% 54% 51% 41% 
Median hearings 2 4 4 4 
Mean hearings 
(SD) 
2.3 
(2.0) 
4.6 
(3.2) 
4.4 
(3.2) 
4.3 
(3.1) 
Total (N) 315,780 611,385 223,960 672,674 
 
97  Application for relief is operationalized by whether the respondent filed for any form of 
relief with the court. For purposes of our analysis, we did not consider voluntary departure to be a 
form of relief. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which considers voluntary departure 
to be a form of removal, not of relief. See, e.g., EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at C2 (“Orders 
of voluntary departure are counted as removals.”). 
98  We measured days to completion based on the earliest date in the EOIR system (for 
example, hearing date or input date) and the case completion date. For pending cases, we used the 
end of fiscal year 2018 (September 30, 2018) as the operative end date. 
99  Because in absentia removal is something that generally occurs outside of detention, Table 
5 relies on our Nondetained Removal Sample. 
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Figure 2 presents another way to visualize the difference between the 
number of hearings in the in absentia cases and other case types. As seen in 
Figure 2, 47% of in absentia removal orders occurred at the very first hearing 
in the case. The pattern was very different among initial case completions 
that did not result in an in absentia order. Less than 9% of non-in absentia
decisions were completed at the first hearing. 
 
Figure 2: Number of Hearings Before Initial Completion,  
by Decision Type (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)100 
At stake in deciding whether and how to include additional case categories 
in the analysis of in absentia removal is an honest assessment of immigrants’ 
interactions with the court. Our analysis of court records at the hearing level 
in both administrative closures and pending cases, for example, reveals that 
respondents or their attorneys were attending these hearings. Specifically, we 
analyzed the hearing-level adjournment codes associated with the last two 
hearings in cases that ended in administrative closures during the study 
period of 2008 to 2018. We found that less than 2% of these hearings were 
adjourned due to either the respondent or the respondent’s attorney not 
appearing at the hearing (n = 2,697 of 136,251).101 EOIR has similarly verified
100  Figure 2 relies on hearing-level data to assess how many hearings had occurred at the time 
that the immigration judge initially completed the case. Of the 1,155,469 initial completions in our 
All Custody Removal Sample, only 4,344 cases (0.37%) were excluded from the analysis due to lack 
of hearing-level data. 
101  See Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors 
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that administrative closures are not associated with failures to appear.102 We 
also analyzed hearing-level adjournment codes associated with the 
penultimate or last hearing in pending cases during our study period. Less 
than 1% (n = 5,497 of 667,436) exhibited a non-appearance at the penultimate 
or most recent hearing. These findings confirm that individuals in cases that 
are administratively closed or remain pending are indeed coming to court. 
One possible objection to including other completions (for example, 
administrative closures) and pending cases in the calculation of the in absentia 
rate is that these are cases that could end with in absentia removal at some 
point in the future. While there is no doubt true that some will ultimately 
conclude in absentia, the data suggest that excluding these cases from the 
calculation is problematic. Other completions and pending cases are actually 
much more similar to cases that do not end in absentia and include significant 
involvement by the respondents in their court proceedings. As summarized in 
Table 5, other completions and pending cases have a high level of attorney 
involvement: 79% of other completions had counsel and 67% of pending cases 
had counsel. They also generally include applications for relief: 52% of other 
completions had at least one application for relief, as did 57% of pending cases. 
Notably, other completions and pending cases involve far more court days than 
in absentia cases: other completions had a median of 667 court days, while 
pending cases had a median of 600 days pending.103 Other completions and 
pending cases also had an average of four hearings already, double that of cases 
that ended in absentia and on par with cases that did not end in absentia.104  
These descriptive statistics reveal that individuals with administratively 
closed or pending cases are in fact interacting with the court system and 
attending their scheduled hearings. Indeed, if they had missed their 
scheduled hearings, they would have been removed in absentia. The fact that 
 
and Judicial Law Clerks, All Support Staff, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-02: 
Definitions and Use of Adjournment, Call-Up, and Case Identification Codes 3 (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=38258359 [https://perma.cc/LTH2-DE7A] 
[hereinafter Adjournment Code Memorandum] (describing Adjournment Code 11, which signifies 
“Other No-Show by Alien/Alien’s Attorney or Rep.,” along with forty-seven other adjournment codes 
describing other reasons for granting adjournments). 
102  See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H1 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2010/
03/04/fy09syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP63-E4W6] (explaining that most administrative closures do 
not relate “directly to failure to appear”). 
103  See supra Table 5. 
104  Id. It is important to acknowledge that the most recently filed pending cases in our study 
only had one hearing, or were still awaiting a hearing, and therefore were more vulnerable to future 
in absentia removal. Specifically, 11% of nondetained pending cases in our study both began in fiscal 
year 2018 and had only one hearing scheduled (n = 74,360 of 672,674). 
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the majority have counsel and applications for relief on file also shows they 
are invested in and engaging with the court process.105 
As we established in Part I, EOIR measures the in absentia rate by 
dividing the number of in absentia removals by the total number of 
immigration judge decisions (issued in absentia and not in absentia).106 Yet, by 
including only immigration judge decisions in their calculation, EOIR’s 
measurement of the in absentia rate ignores the two categories of cases that 
we just discussed: other immigration judge completions and pending cases. 
Over the eleven-year study period (fiscal years 2008–2018), more than 10%—
and in some years upward of 25%—of initial case completions issued were 
administrative closures.107 Moreover, as the number of immigration judge 
decisions has declined, the number of pending cases has skyrocketed, 
exceeding 700,000 by the end of our study period. Appreciating these trends 
opens up new methods of measuring in absentia removal. 
C. Calculating the In Absentia Removal Rate 
With a fuller understanding of case status in immigration court, we now 
turn to calculating the in absentia rate using other completions and pending 
cases in the denominator. 
The first alternative method considers in absentia orders as a percentage 
of all completed cases, which includes both immigration judge decisions and 
other immigration judge completions. We call this the “all case completions” 
method. Other completions, composed primarily of administrative closures, are 
ones in which we find that respondents are coming to court and not ordered 
removed in absentia, yet EOIR’s current approach ignores them entirely.108 
The second alternative method considers in absentia orders as a percentage 
of all pending and completed cases. We call this the “all matters” method. 
Given the very large number of pending cases in which individuals attend 
court hearings for years before a decision is reached, failing to include 
pending cases in the denominator misses the considerable population of 
individuals who are attending ongoing court hearings, and often represented 
by counsel and seeking relief. 
Table 6 presents in absentia removal rates using EOIR’s immigration judge 
method as well as the two alternative approaches just discussed. We find that the 
rates vary based on the method selected. First, applying EOIR’s immigration 
judge decision method, the in absentia rate for the eleven-year period is 18%. In 
 
105  See supra Table 5. 
106  See supra note 57 & accompanying text. 
107  See infra Table 6 and accompanying text. 
108  Our analysis of adjournment codes for cases that were administratively closed underscores 
that these cases are not associated with failures to appear. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text. 
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other words, over the eleven-year period of the study, 82% of initial immigration 
judge decisions were issued with the respondent present in court. 
Table 6 next shows the in absentia rate based on the all completion 
method. The annual rate using this method fluctuated between a low of 10% 
and a high of 25%, with percentages slightly lower when only immigration 
judge decisions are considered. Other completions are especially consequential, 
however, when calculating the proportion of in absentia removal for fiscal years 
2015 and 2016. In those years, immigration judges used higher numbers of 
administrative closures to help manage their docket.109 Eliminating these 
administrative closures from the in absentia rate, as EOIR has chosen to do, 
results in a higher in absentia rate while failing to account for large numbers 
of respondents who have actively engaged in the court process. 
Finally, we calculate the in absentia rate for all matters—that is, both 
completed and pending cases. As the last column in Table 6 reveals, the in 
absentia rate using the all-matters measurement ranged from a low of 4% to a 
high of 7%. The yearly average over the period of our study (2008–2018) was 
4% (SD = .01%). In other words, on average, every year 96% of respondents 
in removal proceedings in United States immigration courts were not 
removed in absentia. 
  
 
109  AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, AILA DOC. NO. 17061538, PRACTICE ADVISORY: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE AND MOTIONS TO RECALENDAR 7 (2017), http://www.aila.org/File/
DownloadEmbeddedFile/72088 [https://perma.cc/PR9Z-TKNB] (highlighting the “dramatic[]” 
increase in immigration judges’ use of administrative closure in immigration court during the second 
term of the Obama Administration, especially after the 2014 “Johnson memo” directed government 
attorneys to “seek administrative closure for non-priority cases”). 
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Table 6: In Absentia Removal Rate (Initial Case Completions), by 
Method and Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (All Custody Status)110 
 IJ Decisions    
In Absentia Removal  
Rate (Among . . .) 
Fiscal  
Year 
In Ab-
sentia111 
Not In 
Absentia 
Other IJ 
Compl-
etions Pending 
IJ 
Deci-
sions 
All 
Compl-
etions 
All  
Matters 
2008 25,355 181,183 9,102 156,714 12% 12% 7% 
2009 22,429 188,718 7,977 191,756 11% 10% 5% 
2010 24,239 175,814 8,828 228,890 12% 12% 6% 
2011 22,034 174,522 6,355 262,541 11% 11% 5% 
2012 19,072 146,313 16,161 291,945 12% 11% 4% 
2013 21,023 114,463 28,517 320,989 16% 13% 4% 
2014 25,698 96,677 30,767 393,271 21% 17% 5% 
2015 38,062 84,899 41,785 416,806 31% 23% 7% 
2016 33,968 86,446 47,877 471,232 28% 20% 5% 
2017 41,453 98,292 28,941 590,671 30% 25% 5% 
2018 44,839 124,335 9,697 707,147 27% 25% 5% 
Summary Statistics 
  Total 318,172 1,471,662 236,007 707,147 18% 16% 12% 
Average 
(SD) 
28,925 
(9,019) 
133,787 
(40,715) 
21,455 
(14,806) 
366,542 
(171,005) 
18% 
(.08%) 
15% 
(.06%) 
4% 
(.01%) 
 
The total in absentia rate from 2008 to 2018 using the all-matters method 
was 12%. This total rate of 12% is somewhat higher than the annual all-matters 
 
110  Table 6 includes only those immigration judge decisions and other immigration judge 
completions that are part of the “initial case completion.” An initial case completion is the first 
dispositive decision issued by the immigration judge in a case. See EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra 
note 47, at C1. The measurements in Table 6 for “other IJ completions” include administrative 
closures and other decisions that administratively end the case (for example, dismissals for failure 
to prosecute and grants of temporary protected status). It does not include changes of venue or 
transfers. For purposes of calculating the “Total” in absentia removal rate with all pending cases for 
the entire eleven-year period, only the cases that remained pending in 2018 (n = 707,147) were 
included in the denominator. Finally, for the purposes of average in absentia removal rates, means 
were weighted by the total number of cases in each year. 
111  To identify cases that resulted in in absentia removal, we selected those proceedings that 
had both (1) removal as the case outcome and (2) a “Y” (yes) indicator in the “absentia” data field. 
We note that all completed proceedings in the EOIR data contained a “Y” or “N” in the “absentia” data 
field. By definition, we did not consider a proceeding to have resulted in in absentia removal where 
the outcome was not removal (n = 3,777 of 319,866). 
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rate (which ranged from 4% to 7%) because we included in the overall 
denominator only those cases that were still pending as of the end of fiscal 
year 2018. Using the overall total, 88% of all removal respondents were not 
subject to in absentia removal during the eleven-year period from 2008 to 2018. 
The all-matters method for measuring the in absentia rate is valuable 
because it captures the growing number of cases that are pending but not yet 
resolved. Due to large and growing court backlogs, cases can take years to 
resolve.112 Not including these pending cases in the measurement of the in 
absentia rate results in over-counting of those cases that end with in absentia 
orders because in absentia decisions occur more quickly and involve fewer 
hearings,113 and those that do not end in absentia can drag on for years. Only 
11% of pending cases in our nondetained sample had just begun their cases in 
fiscal year 2018, suggesting that the vast majority of pending cases were active 
in the court system. 
In conclusion, by eliminating administrative closures and pending cases 
from its published calculations, EOIR ignores a substantial population of 
respondents who came to court and attended all their court proceedings. In 
doing so, EOIR effectively inflates the overall in absentia rate. Our 
measurements show a different picture. 
D. In Absentia Removal by Custody Status 
Thus far, this Article has presented EOIR’s data on the total number of 
in absentia removals along with three possible measurements for the in 
absentia removal rate. In this Section, we extend these three different 
measurement techniques to the Nondetained Removal Sample. We find 
similar patterns to those presented in the previous Section. That is, our all-
matters and all-completions methods yield lower overall in absentia rates than 
the more limited immigration-judge-decision approach adopted by EOIR. 
 
  
 
112  See David Wagner, Asylum-Seekers in California Wait for Their Day in Immigration Court, 
N.P.R. (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:25 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/09/683328305/asylum-seekers-in-
california-wait-for-their-day-in-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/JN7V-YRJN] (featuring 
asylum seekers who have been waiting years for a court decision). 
113  See supra Table 5. 
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Table 7: In Absentia Removal Rate (Initial Case Completions),  
by Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)114 
 IJ Decisions   
In Absentia Removal 
Rate (Among . . .) 
Fiscal  
Year 
In Ab- 
sentia 
Not In  
Absentia 
Other IJ 
Compl-
etions Pending 
IJ  
Deci-
sions 
All  
Compl-
etions 
All  
Matters 
2008 24,882 60,337 8,020 144,996 29% 27% 8% 
2009 22,071 57,640 6,803 178,156 28% 26% 6% 
2010 23,852 64,357 7,883 212,053 27% 25% 6% 
2011 21,739 65,417 5,235 246,153 25% 24% 5% 
2012 18,990 60,344 14,994 275,132 24% 20% 4% 
2013 20,940 56,727 27,243 303,015 27% 20% 4% 
2014 25,587 46,655 29,845 372,884 35% 25% 5% 
2015 37,994 45,467 41,003 393,651 46% 31% 6% 
2016 33,896 47,579 47,071 443,658 42% 26% 5% 
2017 41,374 45,684 28,055 559,855 48% 36% 5% 
2018 44,764 63,975 9,046 673,580 41% 38% 5% 
Summary Statistics 
Total 316,089 614,182 225,198 673,580 34% 27% 17% 
Average 
(SD) 
28,735 
(9,092) 
55,835 
(7,990) 
20,473 
(14,877) 
345,739 
(163,990) 
34% 
(8%) 
27% 
(6%) 
5% 
(1%) 
 
Table 7 presents our in absentia findings for individuals who were released 
or never detained. The rates are highest when only immigration judge 
decisions are used as the denominator, somewhat lower when all completions 
are used, and significantly lower when pending cases are added into the 
calculation (“All Matters”). Consider, for example, the in absentia rates for 
2018. The in absentia rate for nondetained respondents was 41% when only 
immigration judge decisions are considered, 38% as a proportion of all 
completed cases, and only 5% as a percentage of all matters. 
 
114  Table 7 calculates the in absentia removal rate using three different methods: immigration 
judge decisions, all completions, and all matters. In calculating the average in absentia removal rates, 
means were weighted by the total number of cases in each year. The total in absentia rate for all 
matters includes only the cases that remained pending in 2018 in the denominator.  
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E. Notice Issues and Reopening of In Absentia Removal Orders 
Another missing component of EOIR’s approach to measuring in absentia 
is appreciation of whether respondents receive effective notice of the removal 
proceedings. Whether immigrants are made aware of their court hearings in 
accordance with due process cuts to the heart of who is considered at fault for 
a failure to appear. This Section analyzes the problem of lack of notice and 
investigates immigrants’ efforts to reopen their removal orders issued without 
proper notice. 
A 2018 United States Supreme Court decision, Pereira v. Sessions,115 has 
drawn national attention to the chronic and widespread deficits in providing 
individuals notice of their immigration hearings.116 In 2006, Wescley Fonseca 
Pereira was served with a charging document (known as a “notice to appear” 
or NTA) that did not contain the date and time of his immigration court 
hearing.117 Instead, the document ordered Mr. Pereira, who came to the 
United States in 2000 and overstayed his visa, to appear in court at a date and 
time that would be set in the future.118 
Over a year later, the immigration court mailed a notice containing the 
actual date and time of Mr. Pereira’s hearing, but Mr. Pereira never received 
it because the court did not send it to his correct address.119 When Mr. Pereira 
failed to appear at his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia. After 
being arrested for a motor vehicle violation in 2013, Mr. Pereira found out 
that he had been ordered removed.120 
With the help of counsel, Mr. Pereira successfully reopened his prior 
court proceeding on the ground that he never received notice of the original 
hearing.121 After the immigration judge rescinded the in absentia order, Mr. 
Pereira applied for a form of relief known as cancellation of removal.122 One 
of the requirements to qualify for cancellation of removal is at least ten years 
of continuous presence in the United States.123 Mr. Pereira argued that he 
satisfied this requirement because he had been in the United State since 2000, 
 
115  138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). 
116  See, e.g., Joel Rose, Supreme Court Ruling Means Thousands of Deportation Cases May Be Tossed 
Out, NPR (Sept. 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/17/648832694/supreme-court-
ruling-means-thousands-of-deportation-cases-may-be-tossed-out [https://perma.cc/N38U-CBAU] 
(explaining that, although the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira did not initially receive much 
attention, it has since called attention to notice defects in thousands of deportation cases). 
117  Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2112. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2018) (providing criteria for the remedy of 
cancellation of removal for “certain nonpermanent residents”). 
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while the government claimed that he could not satisfy this requirement 
because his “cancellation clock”—that is, the measurement of how long he had 
been in the United States—had stopped when he was served with the notice 
to appear back in 2006.124  
The issue on appeal before the United States Supreme Court was whether 
service of a charging document that does not contain the time and date of the 
immigration court hearing can “stop time” for purposes of eligibility for 
cancellation of removal.125 Section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act contains an explicit requirement that immigration cases begin with the 
service of an NTA, which must specify the “time and place at which the 
proceedings will be held.”126 However, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), the administrative body that decides direct appeals from immigration 
court, previously concluded that the time and date of the initial hearing need 
not be included on the NTA to trigger the stop-time rule.127 
The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the answer to the question was 
“obvious.”128 Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor explained that the 
“plain text, the statutory context, and common sense all lead inescapably and 
unambiguously to [the] conclusion” that “[a] notice that does not inform a 
noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceedings” is not a “notice 
to appear” under the immigration law.129 Therefore, without the time and date, 
such a notice cannot freeze the clock for accruing continuous presence.130 
Although Pereira dealt squarely with the stop-time rule, the facts of the 
case call attention to the routine and troubling practice of issuing notices to 
appear without the time or date information. In fact, at oral argument, counsel 
for the government admitted that “almost 100 percent” of notices to appear issued 
over the past three years had omitted the date and time of the proceeding.131 
 
124  Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2112; see also I.N.A. § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (“[A]ny 
period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed 
to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear.”). 
125  See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110. 
126  I.N.A. § 239(a)(1)(G)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2019) 
(authorizing Department of Homeland Security officials to serve a respondent with a “notice to 
appear” in immigration court, in accordance with § 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
127  Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (citing Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647, 651 (2011)). 
128  Id. at 2109-10. Justice Alito, the sole dissenting Justice, concluded that a “straightforward 
application of Chevron” required acceptance of the government’s own construction of the statute, rather 
than one that the Court regarded as the “best reading of the statute.” Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
129  Id. at 2110. 
130  Id. 
131  Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (No. 17-459) 
(Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, responding to Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy). In practice, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) often served 
charging documents with no date or time for the hearing because DHS did not learn when the 
hearing would be scheduled until it filed the charging document with the immigration court. 
Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All of 
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This pervasive defect in notice is part of the reason why noncitizens do not 
appear in court.132 The facts of Mr. Pereira’s case also underscore how clerical 
court errors—such as serving a notice to the wrong address—can further deprive 
respondents of ever learning about their hearings.133  
To address these notice deficits, we evaluated how often immigration 
judges identified failures to appear occurring due to notice issues. Each time 
a hearing ends, the immigration court enters an “adjournment code” that 
describes the reason why the hearing was adjourned. One of these codes 
indicates that notice was sent or served incorrectly.134 Looking at the cases of 
individuals who were never detained, we found that immigration judges 
adjourned fewer than 1% of initial hearings due to notice issues.135 However, 
when judges did adjourn these missed hearings due to notice issues, we found 
 
EOIR, Policy Memorandum 19-08: Acceptance of Notices to Appear and Use of the Interactive 
Scheduling System 1 (Dec. 21, 2018), http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=46363627 
[https://perma.cc/JP6L-GHRY]. This practice is beginning to change after Pereira. See id. at 1-2 
(“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions . . . EOIR began providing dates and 
times directly to DHS to use on NTAs . . . .”). 
132  For further discussion of practice issues in the wake of Pereira, see CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: PEREIRA V. SESSIONS—UPDATED STRATEGIES 
AND CONSIDERATIONS (2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/council-practice-advisory-pereira-v-
sessions [https://perma.cc/RP98-LWKD]; DAN KESSELBRENNER ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD & IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, PRACTICE ADVISORY: 
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF NOTICES TO APPEAR LACKING TIME-AND-PLACE 
INFORMATION 9-19 (2018), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/
practice_advisories/gen/2018_5July_PereiraAdvisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK84-VH2Q]. 
133  Litigation is ongoing over the jurisdictional validity of removal orders issued based on 
charging documents without time and date information. In August 2018, the BIA issued a 
precedential decision which limits the application of Pereira to the stop-time rule in requests for 
cancellation of removal. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 442-43 (B.I.A. 2018). Specifically, 
the BIA found that an NTA “that does not specify the time and place of an alien’s initial removal 
hearing vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and meets the 
requirements of [§ 1229(a)], so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent 
to the alien.” Id. at 447. Some federal courts of appeals have found, consistent with Bermudez-Cota, 
that an NTA that fails to include date and time can still vest jurisdiction with the immigration court 
so long as a notice of a hearing specifying this information is later sent to the respondent. See, e.g., 
Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192, 196-97 (6th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 
1158-59, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1106 (2020). Other courts have rejected this 
view, concluding that DHS may not rely on a subsequent notice of hearing to cure a defective NTA. 
See, e.g., Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr, No. 19-9517, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020); Guadalupe v. 
Attorney Gen. United States, No. 19-2239, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2020). 
134  Adjournment Code Memorandum, supra note 101, at 3 (including Adjournment Code 10, 
to be used when an “[a]ttorney and/or alien does not appear at the scheduled hearing due to the 
notice of hearing containing inaccurate information, or, alien/attorney appears but has not received 
adequate notice of hearing of the proceedings”). 
135  Analyzing never-detained cases, we found that 11,121 out of a total of 1,285,947 initial 
hearings, or .86%, were adjourned due to lack of notice. This calculation measures the number of 
hearings that were adjourned with code 10, “Notice Sent/Served Incorrectly.” See supra note 134. Use 
of adjournment code 10 in our data dates back to the 1980s. 
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that 54% of these respondents appeared in court at the next hearing.136 This 
is an essential data point, from which we draw two important conclusions. 
First, although Pereira revealed that notice issues were prevalent during our 
study period, notice issues were rarely identified by immigration judges. 
Second, when immigration judges did pay attention to notice issues, the 
majority of respondents made it to court after the notice issue was addressed. 
Part of the story behind the lack of attention to proper notice is the fact 
that immigration judges do not have decisional independence. Currently, 
immigration judges are part of the Department of Justice and appointed, 
reviewed, and disciplined by the Attorney General.137 As immigration scholar 
Jill Family explains, the structure of immigration courts “provides no formal 
protections for these administrative decision makers.”138 Concerns have been 
raised that immigration adjudicators are hired based on their political 
loyalties,139 and that, as a result, ruling against the government could be 
hazardous to their job.140 Growing case backlogs, strict case quotas, and 
mandatory timelines for case completions have further amplified the pressures 
on immigration judges.141 This lack of judicial independence no doubt increases 
pressure to enter in absentia orders quickly without first rigorously evaluating 
the merits of whether proper notice was in fact supplied to the respondent.142 
 
136  Analyzing both completed and pending cases, we found that 5,981 out of the 11,121 hearings 
adjourned for lack of notice at the initial-hearing stage did not end in absentia, compared to 5,140 
that did result in an in absentia order. 
137  See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration 
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 543 (2011) (“One major problem with the system is a 
lack of decisional independence at the administrative level. The lack of decisional independence 
stems from the placement of immigration judges and the Board as mere employees of the Attorney 
General.”); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 10-12 (2008), https://www.naij-usa.org/
images/uploads/publications/Urgent-Priority_1-1-08_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV2F-8WWQ] 
(raising concerns regarding the lack of judicial independence). 
138  Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing Immigration Removal and 
Benefits Adjudication, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 45, 51 (2011). 
139  Id. 
140  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
369, 385-403 (2006) (arguing that judicial independence is necessary to uphold the rule of law). 
141  See, e.g., Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Director, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, to Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, All Immigration Judges, All Court 
Administrators, and All Immigration Court Staff (Jan. 17, 2018), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/
ld.php?content_id=39231331 [https://perma.cc/C6NP-7HAV] (outlining case completion goals and 
performance metrics for immigration judges). 
142  In an important new study, Catherine Kim and Amy Semet find that the presidential 
administration that is in control is a statistically significant predictor of removal rates. Catherine Y. 
Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. 
L.J. 579, 625-27 (2020). This troubling finding increases concern that decisions of political actors 
within the administration may in fact influence the decisionmaking of immigration judges. 
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Given that so few judges adjourn hearings due to notice issues, we next 
evaluated what happened after the initial in absentia order was entered. Most 
immigration cases end after an initial case completion,143 but some cases do 
continue on to a subsequent case completion.144 Like an initial case 
completion, a subsequent case completion can end in a decision on the merits, 
like a removal, relief, or termination decision, or an administrative completion, 
such as administrative closure or transfer. In other words, an initial proceeding 
that ends with in absentia removal might be subsequently reopened and a new 
proceeding conducted. Importantly, the government’s reporting of in absentia 
removal omits any analysis of subsequent case completions. 
Under the immigration law, an in absentia removal order may be 
challenged in court and reversed if the respondent did not receive notice of 
the hearing or if there were other “exceptional circumstances” that caused 
their failure to appear.145 Common reasons identified by immigration 
attorneys for failures to appear in immigration court include not receiving 
notice of the hearing, serious health or transportation problems, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel.146 In practice, the respondent or respondent’s 
 
143  EOIR defines an “initial case” as “[t]he proceeding that begins when the Department of 
Homeland Security files a charging document with an immigration court and ends when an immigration 
judge renders a determination.” EOIR 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 9, Glossary of Terms at 7. 
144  EOIR defines a “subsequent case” as a proceeding “that begins when: 1) the immigration 
judge grants a motion to reopen, reconsider, or recalendar; or 2) the Board of Immigration Appeals 
issues a decision to remand and ends when the immigration judge renders a determination.” Id., 
Glossary of Terms at 11. For example, according to the EOIR data published in its Statistics 
Yearbooks, in 2016 there were 186,434 initial case completions and 20,609 subsequent case 
completions. EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at A8. 
145  I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018). See generally BETH WERLIN, AM. 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: RESCINDING AN IN ABSENTIA ORDER OF 
REMOVAL 7-10 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/practice_advisory/
rescinding-absentia-order-removal [https://perma.cc/8TAX-UMNT] (providing legal guidance on 
how to establish exceptional circumstances); Rebecca Feldmann, What Constitutes Exceptional? The 
Intersection of Circumstances Warranting Reopening of Removal Proceedings After Entry of an In Absentia 
Order of Removal and Due Process Rights of Noncitizens, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 219, 224, 234-45 
(2008) (arguing that “circumstances beyond a person’s control, as clearly established by the totality 
of the circumstances” should meet the statutory “exceptional circumstances” requirement). Each 
immigration judge also has the authority to reopen any proceeding in which she issued a decision, 
upon the judge’s own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2019). For an excellent overview of motions 
to reopen, see MICHELLE MENDEZ & REBECCA SCHOLTZ, CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION NETWORK, 
INC., PRACTICE ADVISORY: MOTIONS TO REOPEN FOR DACA RECIPIENTS WITH REMOVAL 
ORDERS 14-32 (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/removal-proceedings/practice-advisory-
motions-reopen-daca-recipients-removal-orders [https://perma.cc/33A9-5LJ5]. We also thank the 
Honorable Mimi Tsankov, Regional Vice President, National Association of Immigration Judges, 
for helping us to understand motions to reopen. 
146 CONCHITA CRUZ ET AL., ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT & CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., A GUIDE TO ASSISTING ASYLUM-SEEKERS WITH IN ABSENTIA 
REMOVAL ORDERS 4 (2019), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/asylum-and-refugee-law/guide-
assisting-asylum-seekers-absentia-removal-orders [https://perma.cc/JX9H-V73X]. 
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attorney would bring a motion to reopen the proceeding, explain the reasons 
why the hearing was missed, and ask the judge to rescind the in absentia order 
and continue with the merits of the case.147 
Using our Nondetained Removal Sample of EOIR data,148 we analyzed 
the impact of subsequent case review on in absentia removal orders. Overall, 
as seen in Table 8, in absentia removal occurred in 316,089 nondetained initial 
case completions over the eleven years of our study. Of these, 15% (n = 47,952) 
were successfully reopened.149 
 
Table 8: Reopening of In Absentia Removal Orders,  
by Fiscal Year (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)150 
Fiscal Year 
In Absentia  
at Initial 
Completion 
Successful  
Motion to Reopen 
Reopened 
(Percent) 
2008 24,882 4,716 19% 
2009 22,071 4,560 21% 
2010 23,852 4,651 19% 
2011 21,739 4,331 20% 
2012 18,990 3,464 18% 
2013 20,940 3,799 18% 
2014 25,587 4,188 16% 
2015 37,994 5,558 15% 
2016 33,896 4,589 14% 
2017 41,374 4,812 12% 
2018 44,764 3,284 7% 
Total 316,089 47,952 15% 
 
These results show that some cases in which a judge issued an in absentia 
order of removal were later successfully reopened. This finding is important 
 
147  TRINA REALMUTO & KRISTIN MACLEOD-BALL, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 
PRACTICE ADVISORY: THE BASICS OF MOTIONS TO REOPEN EOIR-ISSUED REMOVAL ORDERS 
PRACTICE ADVISORY 4-5 (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/the_basics_of_motions_to_reopen_eoir-issued_removal_orders_practice_
advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2X5-L2MQ]. 
148  See supra Section II.D. 
149  In contrast, of the 839,380 initial case completions that did not end in an in absentia removal 
order, we found that only 0.58% (n = 4,865) had been ordered removed at the most recent proceeding. 
150  Table 8 counts as reopened those cases in which respondents were ordered removed in 
absentia at the initial case completion, but then had a subsequently opened proceeding. “Fiscal Year” 
corresponds to the year of the initial case completion (not the year that the case was reopened). 
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because the analysis of in absentia relied on by the government assumes that 
all in absentia orders are entered for individuals who never come to court. On 
the contrary, as many as one-fifth of those removed in absentia in any given 
year did later come to court to protest the entry of the in absentia order.151 
In addition, older cases have a higher rate of reopening than newer cases. 
For cases that received an in absentia order in 2008, 19% have been reopened.152 
In contrast, only 7% of in absentia orders entered in 2018 have been 
reopened.153 This outcome makes sense, as many individuals with in absentia 
orders may not yet be aware that they were ordered removed and need time 
to make a motion to reopen in immigration court. Given the legal complexity 
of such a motion, individuals will also need time to find and retain counsel. 
Over time, therefore, we can expect the percentage of in absentia cases that 
are reopened to rise.154  
Whether a case is reopened, however, rests in the hands of immigration 
judges. In order to grant a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order, a 
judge must find that the hearing notice was defective, the respondent was in 
custody at the time of the hearing,155 or that exceptional circumstances 
excused the failure to appear.156 Of the 316,089 cases where initial completion 
occurred through an in absentia removal order, 18% (n = 56,877) of those 
 
151  See supra Table 8. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  A motion to reopen based on lack of notice of the hearing can be brought at any time. See 
I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (2019) (noting 
that an alien can file a motion to reopen at “any time”). Of course, individuals who do not obtain 
counsel or otherwise learn about the motion to reopen process may never bring such a motion in 
court. Additionally, although cases with in absentia orders may be reopened, in absentia orders cannot 
be appealed. See Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in 
Immigration Removal Adjudication 21 (June 7, 2012) (draft report), https://www.acus.gov/report/
immigration-removal-adjudication-report [https://perma.cc/46PZ-KY5X] (“The BIA has held that 
a respondent may not appeal from an in absentia order although in some cases the individual may 
seek a motion to reopen.”). 
155  See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (providing for rescission of a 
removal order “upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien 
did not receive notice . . . or the alien demonstrates that the alien was in Federal or State custody 
and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien”). 
156  A respondent may later reopen the immigration case based on a showing that the failure 
to appear was due to exceptional circumstances. See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) 
(stating that an in absentia removal order may be rescinded “upon a motion to reopen filed within 
180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear 
was because of exceptional circumstances”); see also I.N.A. § 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) 
(indicating that exceptional circumstances include “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child 
or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or 
parent of the alien”). 
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respondents sought to reopen their cases by filing motions to reopen.157 
Judges granted 84% of these motions (n = 47,952). Overall, 15% of those 
ordered removed in absentia had a successful motion to reopen (n = 47,952 of 
316,089).158 This finding suggests that those who have moved to reopen by 
and large have meritorious grounds for reopening their cases. 
Our findings about the reopening of in absentia orders are consistent with 
an influential report by Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC). 
Analyzing in absentia cases handled by their office since 2015, CLINIC found 
that their lawyers were able to successfully reopen 96% of these in absentia 
orders.159 Judges were willing to reopen because CLINIC’s clients had 
“legitimate reasons for being unable to attend their hearings, including lack 
of notice, incorrect government information, serious medical problems, 
language barriers, and severe trauma or disabilities.”160 
In conclusion, Part I relied on statistics presented in the EOIR Statistics 
Yearbooks to summarize how the government has presented in absentia 
removal over the past decade. We showed that the measurement of in absentia 
removal has been limited to the percentage of in absentia orders among 
immigration judge decisions and has not included other completions or 
pending matters in these calculations. In Part II we engaged in our own 
original analysis of the EOIR data to develop new methods for measuring 
in absentia removal. Overall, we found that the number of in absentia removal 
orders has increased somewhat since 2008, but this increase has been far 
outpaced by the addition of new cases into the immigration courts. Only 12% 
of all matters in the immigration courts since 2008 ended in an in absentia 
removal order.161 Moreover, 15% of initial case completions that ended with 
in absentia removal were later successfully reopened.162 These and other 
findings introduced in Part II contribute a clearer picture of how to measure 
in absentia removal. 
 
157  EOIR provides data on all motions filed before the immigration courts, including 
“Motions to Reopen” and “Motions to Reopen for In Absentia.” Of the 56,877 respondents who 
sought to reopen their cases, we include 191 respondents who did not have motions to reopen in the 
data but whose in absentia removal orders were clearly rescinded, as indicated by the opening of 
subsequent proceedings. 
158  We note that of these 47,952 individuals with a successful motion to reopen, 7% (n = 3,523) 
were ultimately ordered removed in absentia. 
159  DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 6, 17. 
160  Id. at 6. 
161  See supra Table 6. 
162  See supra Table 8. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING IN ABSENTIA REMOVAL 
In Part III, we seek to discover additional factors associated with in 
absentia removal. As the discussion that follows reveals, we find that whether 
someone receives an in absentia order is associated with three important 
variables: attorney representation, applications for relief from removal, and 
judge assignment. 
A. Attorney Involvement 
Noncitizens have a right to be represented by counsel in immigration 
proceedings, but generally not at the expense of the government.163 Following 
a 2010 court decision, one exception to this rule is for individuals in detention 
who have serious mental impairments. In such cases, counsel is appointed by 
the court.164 Immigration court rules allow respondents to be represented by 
attorneys or, less frequently, by “accredited representatives” who are not 
attorneys but work for nonprofit organizations that specialize in immigration 
court practice.165 
Prior to representing someone in court, attorneys must file a Notice of 
Entry of Appearance (EOIR-28).166 The EOIR data allow us to determine 
 
163  See I.N.A. § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2018) (“[T]he alien shall have the 
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing 
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 
549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due process right to obtain counsel of their choice at their 
own expense.”). 
164  See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1051-58 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that 
plaintiffs’ mental conditions and the importance of the issues in their cases mandated 
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act in the form of providing “Qualified Representatives” 
for “the entirety of their immigration proceedings”). After the district court decision in Franco-
Gonzalez, the United States agreed to a nationwide policy to appoint counsel for immigrants with 
serious mental disabilities. See Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for 
Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguards-unrepresented-
immigration-detainees.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR36-3HET] (“EOIR will make available a qualified 
representative to unrepresented detainees who are deemed mentally incompetent to represent 
themselves in immigration proceedings.”). 
165  See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (2019) (providing criteria under which qualifying organizations 
may designate non-attorney representatives to practice before an immigration judge or immigration 
law enforcement agency); see also 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a)(4) (designating these non-attorney 
representatives “accredited representatives” and authorizing their practice). For a thoughtful 
discussion of the options available to expand access to legal representation in immigration court, see 
Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, MPI INSIGHT (Migration Policy Inst., 
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, at 1, 12-16, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revisiting-need-
appointed-counsel [https://perma.cc/F2CY-RH5V]. 
166  See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Form EOIR-28, Notice of 
Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before the Immigration Court (rev. Dec. 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir28.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7UN-7BHS] [hereinafter 
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whether a respondent had counsel because they report whether an EOIR-28 
form was filed with the immigration court.167 If the required form was filed 
with the court prior to or by the conclusion of the relevant proceeding, we 
counted the respondent as represented.168 We also counted respondents with 
late-filed EOIR-28 forms as represented if court records showed that an 
attorney appeared in an immigration court hearing during the relevant 
proceeding. 
To evaluate the relationship between representation and in absentia 
orders, we examined the rate of in absentia removals among those who had 
counsel over the eleven-year study period. As seen in Figure 3, individuals 
with counsel rarely received in absentia removal orders. Among nondetained 
represented respondents who reached an initial immigration judge’s merits 
decision, only 8% were ordered removed in absentia.169 Among all nondetained 
cases that reached an immigration judge completion, only 6% with counsel 
ended with in absentia removal.170 Finally, if all nondetained matters are 
considered, the in absentia rate for represented respondents was only 4%.171 
 
 
EOIR-28 Form]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (“In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge in 
which the alien is represented, the attorney or representative shall file a Notice of Entry of 
Appearance on Form EOIR-28 with the Immigration Court.”). 
167  Our replication of calculations published in the EOIR’s annual reports reveals that the 
filing of the EOIR-28 form is also relied upon by EOIR in its statistical analysis of representation 
by counsel in immigration court.  
168  In December 2015, the EOIR-28 form was revised to allow for an attorney to represent the 
respondent in the bond proceedings without taking on the merits of the case. See EOIR-28 Form, 
supra note 166; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (“The entry of appearance of an attorney or 
representative in a custody or bond proceeding . . . shall be separate and apart from . . . appearance 
in any other proceeding before the Immigration Court. . . . [A] representative may file an EOIR-28 
indicating whether the entry of appearance is for custody or bond proceedings only, any other 
proceedings only, or for all proceedings.”). For purposes of our analysis, we only measure whether 
an EOIR-28 form was filed as part of the merits portion of the case. 
169  Out of all the immigration judge initial merits decisions issued in cases involving 
nondetained respondents during our study period (n = 930,271), 62% (n = 574,199) had counsel. 
170  Out of all the nondetained immigration judge initial case completions (both merits and 
other completions) issued during our study period (n = 1,155,469), 66% (n = 766,576) had counsel. 
171  Out of all the nondetained immigration judge initial case completions and pending cases 
occurring during our study period (n = 1,829,049), 63% (n = 1,148,544) had counsel. 
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Figure 3: In Absentia Removal Rate Among Respondents with Counsel,  
by Calculation Method (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)172 
We also find that most cases in which judges entered in absentia orders 
involved unrepresented litigants. Overall, only 15% of those who were ordered 
removed in absentia during our study period had an attorney.173 By contrast, 
86% of those who avoided an in absentia order had counsel.174 
Similar patterns were associated with the reopening of in absentia orders. 
As discussed in Part II, 15% of nondetained in absentia orders entered over the 
past eleven years have been reopened.175 We find that the ability to reopen is 
mainly reserved for those who find counsel. That is, among those who were 
able to successfully reopen their case after an in absentia removal order, 84% 
had a lawyer representing them.176 
172  Figure 3 measures the percent of represented respondents that were ordered removed in 
absentia from 2008 to 2018.
173  Of the 316,089 in absentia orders issued in removal proceedings at the initial case 
completion over the eleven-year period of our study, only 47,350 were represented by counsel. 
174 Of the 839,380 immigration judge initial completions not issued in absentia in removal 
proceedings over the eleven-year period of our study, 719,226 were represented by counsel. The 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC) has also found, based on data released by EOIR, 
that individuals without attorneys are at higher risk of being removed in absentia. See FOIA 
Disclosures on In Absentia Removal Numbers Based on Legal Representation, CLINIC LEGAL (Mar. 27, 
2020), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/freedom-information-act/foia-disclosures-absentia-removal-
numbers-based-legal [https://perma.cc/47CD-C3J5].
175  See supra Table 8. 
176  Of the 47,952 respondents who successfully reopened their cases after an initial in absentia
order, 40,303 were represented by counsel at their most recent proceeding.
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 As these striking statistics suggest, attorneys play a vital supporting role 
in ensuring that their clients make it to court.177 Without a lawyer, some 
respondents attend their check-in appointments with ICE believing erroneously 
that it is their court date and then miss their actual court date.178 Other 
respondents have reported missing their hearings after being given NTAs with 
no court date or with a fake court date at an erroneous location.179 
Unrepresented respondents may also encounter challenges in completing the 
necessary court documents to reschedule an immigration court hearing or to 
notify the court about a change of address.180 For example, despite policy to 
the contrary,181 immigration courts do not always accept notifications of changes 
of address before proceedings have formally begun, leaving respondents unable 
to receive notice of their hearings at their current address.182  
Attorneys receive written notice of hearing dates and times and therefore 
can notify their clients about when their hearing is scheduled and where the 
court is located.183 Attorneys can also help their clients who do not speak 
English by interpreting forms and notices into their clients’ primary 
 
177  Recognizing the crucial role that attorneys play, Stephen Manning and Juliet Stumpf argue 
in favor of a large scale and collaborative representation model—“big immigration law”—in which 
teams of volunteer attorneys focus on specific legal issues and geographic areas to increase 
representation rates and ensure access to justice. Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration 
Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 420-32 (2018). 
178  Respondents awaiting immigration court hearings are often told to report periodically to a 
deportation officer. We thank New York-based immigration attorney Jeffrey Chase for this example. 
179  See, e.g., Tatiana Sanchez, Confusion Erupts as Dozens Show Up for Fake Court Date at SF 
Immigration Court, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/
Confusion-erupts-as-dozens-show-up-for-fake-13579045.php [https://perma.cc/BHJ2-CQ3X] 
(reporting that some attorneys contend that ICE is sending notices to appear “with court dates it 
knows are not real”). 
180  See DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 15 (discussing some of the challenges that 
pro se respondents encounter in filing motions and changing their address with the immigration court). 
181  Memorandum from Mark Pasierb, Chief Clerk of Immigration Court, to All Immigration 
Judges, All Court Administrators, All Attorney Advisors and Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration 
Court Staff 6 (June 17, 2008), https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=52153727 
[https://perma.cc/3CUT-QHWZ] (“EOIR-33/ICs are accepted even if no Notice to Appear has 
been filed.”). 
182  See, e.g., AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions and Answers 3 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/29/eoiraila102108.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8SK-8NEL] (reporting rejections of changes of address forms in cases where the notice 
to appear had not yet been filed with the court). 
183  The EOIR’s mandatory electronic registry for attorneys and accredited representatives 
provides notice directly to counsel. See Registry for Attorneys and Representatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 
28,124, 28,124 (May 13, 2013) (“The eRegistry will individually and uniquely identify each registered 
attorney or accredited representative and associate the information provided during registration with 
that attorney or accredited representative. This will increase efficiency by reducing system errors in 
scheduling matters and providing improved notice to attorneys and accredited representatives.”). 
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language.184 When court dates change or judges are reassigned, attorneys can 
explain these essential changes to their clients. If a hearing is scheduled at a 
time or location that is not feasible for a respondent to attend, attorneys can 
file a motion with the court to change the venue or time and date of the 
hearing. Without this assistance, respondents can get confused about where 
and when to report to court.185 
In highlighting the association between counsel and court appearance, we 
acknowledge that attorneys may select cases of individuals who have stronger 
claims and thus are more highly motivated to attend their court hearings.186 
Similarly, individuals who seek out and hire attorneys may be less likely to 
miss a court appearance because they have invested in the process. 
Furthermore, in demonstrating the value of effective counsel, we do not mean 
to suggest that attorneys always help their clients to attend court. As Chief 
Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, 
unskilled and unscrupulous immigration attorneys have been known to fail to 
notify their clients of the hearing dates they were required to attend.187 In 
these unfortunate circumstances, relying on a lawyer to navigate the court 
process could actually lead to missing the court hearing. 
The immigration court does provide an 800 number to call for 
information about future court dates,188 but many respondents may be 
unaware of this service. In addition, this toll-free line only provides access to 
a recording and requires that the caller have the respondent’s eight or nine 
digit case identification number to receive information.189 The EOIR hotline 
 
184  As Jennifer Koh has noted, in absentia orders also raise important issues about quality of 
counsel. Not all attorneys provide quality representation and in some cases fail to properly notify 
their clients about upcoming hearings or miss court themselves. See Koh, supra note 24, at 225 
(explaining that in absentia orders “raise unique access to counsel issues that require an acknowledgment 
of how the quality of counsel matters”). 
185  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Fearful of Court, Asylum Seekers Are Banished in Absentia, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (July 30, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/30/fearful-of-court-
asylum-seekers-are-deported-in-absentia [https://perma.cc/AYM3-L7CH] (featuring a case of an 
unrepresented individual who was almost ordered removed in absentia when he mistakenly went to a city 
courthouse in Charleston, South Carolina instead of the immigration court in Charlotte, North Carolina). 
186  See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 51, at 48 (discussing selection bias issues in representation 
in immigration court). 
187  Robert A. Katzmann, Study Group on Immigrant Representation: The First Decade, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 488 (2018); see also DENIED A DAY IN COURT, supra note 27, at 25-26 
(featuring examples of individuals who missed their hearing because their attorney failed to notify 
them of the court date). 
188  See Customer Service Initiatives, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/customer-service-initiatives [https://perma.cc/FQ72-
ND4P] (updated Mar. 20, 2018) (explaining that by calling the 800 number, a “customer[]” can 
obtain information including the “[n]ext hearing date, time, and location”). 
189  See id. (explaining how the “automated immigration court information system” functions 
and explaining that “[t]o access case information, callers must use the alien registration number, 
which begins with the letter A and is followed by an 8- or 9-digit number”). Using the toll-free line 
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is also only available in English and Spanish,190 making it inaccessible to 
individuals who do not speak these languages. 
Our findings on the strong association between counsel and court 
appearance rates build on an earlier study by the Vera Institute for Justice on 
the Legal Orientation Programs (LOP), a program that provides know-your-
rights sessions and intensive pro se training sessions for individuals in 
detention.191 The Vera Institute’s study found that LOP participants who 
received know-your-rights services, as compared to those who did not, had a 
7% lower rate of in absentia removal after release.192 
Vera’s findings are consistent with studies of other court systems 
indicating that individuals with access to information about the court process 
are more likely to come to court.193 For example, a program in Jefferson 
County, Colorado called unrepresented misdemeanants and traffic offenders 
to remind them about their misdemeanor and traffic offense hearings.194 The 
 
is so complicated that nonprofit organizations have created materials describing how to call the line 
to obtain information about your court date. See, e.g., Cómo Chequear el Status de su Caso, ASYLUM 
SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT, https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Checking-
Your-Status-with-Copyright.png [https://perma.cc/P4SD-75YP] (providing Spanish-language 
instructions for accessing commonly sought information through the automated toll-free system). 
If there is an in absentia order, pressing “1” will tell the caller that there is no hearing scheduled. 
They must know to press “3” in order to learn about an in absentia order. See id. 
190  Customer Service Initiatives, supra note 188. 
191  See SIULC ET AL., supra note 75, at iii-iv, 7-9 (explaining that the LOP, originally funded 
in 2002 through a $1 million congressional appropriation to DOJ, “refer[s] cases to volunteer 
attorneys and conduct[s] individual and group orientations on immigration law and procedure . . . 
for detained persons in removal proceedings”). 
192  Id. at 56-57. 
193  See PRETRIAL JUSTICE CTR. FOR COURTS, PRETRIAL JUSTICE BRIEF 10, USE OF COURT 
DATE REMINDER NOTICES TO IMPROVE COURT APPEARANCE RATES 1-4 (2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/PJCC/PJCC%20Brief%2010%20Sept%202017
%20Court%20Date%20Notification%20Systems.ashx [https://perma.cc/38SW-Y8MF] (explaining 
that “notification systems may help to improve the court appearance rates of defendants, thereby 
reducing the community and court costs associated with missed hearings,” and summarizing the 
effects of four approaches to court date notification systems on failure-to-appear rates); David I. 
Rosenbaum et al., Court Date Reminder Postcards: A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Using Reminder Cards to 
Reduce Failure to Appear Rates, 95 JUDICATURE 177, 178-80 (2012) (evaluating the results of the 
Nebraska Postcard Reminder Project which reduced failure-to-appear rates at misdemeanor hearings 
by almost 25%). Related research has suggested that individuals who are given notice of other court 
obligations, such as the requirement of paying a fine, are more likely to do so if enhanced notice is 
given. See, e.g., BETH A. COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS WITH GRADUATED 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY 19-20, HAMILTON PROJECT (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Colgan_PP_201903014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G93J-TVWZ] (stating that supportive collection practices such as the “issuance of notices 
prior to payment due dates, similar to those used to remind people of due dates for utilities, credit 
cards, and the like, are also helpful” in improving collections). 
194  Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court-
Appearance Rates and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The Jefferson County, 
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program reduced the failure-to-appear rate from 21% to only 12%.195 Results 
were even better when the caller spoke personally with the defendant (rather 
than just leaving a message): the failure-to-appear rate for these individuals 
dipped to only 8%.196 A reminder program implemented in the misdemeanor 
court in Coconino County, Arizona had similar success.197 The failure-to-appear 
rate for those who were called in the reminder program was only 12.9%, compared 
to 25.4% in the control group.198 For those who were personally contacted on the 
phone, the rate was the lowest: only 5.9% failed to appear.199 
These and other studies underscore that many people miss court simply 
because they are not notified about their hearing, do not recognize the 
importance of attending, do not know where to go, or simply forget about their 
court date. Language barriers and unfamiliarity with the court process and notice 
procedures compound these difficulties. As we discuss further in the Conclusion, 
EOIR could improve appearance rates by addressing these notice issues. 
B. Applications for Relief 
Immigration removal proceedings are best understood as occurring in two 
stages.200 In the first stage, the immigration judge decides whether to sustain 
the charge of removability alleged by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in the NTA.201 If the charge is sustained and the 
respondent is found to be subject to removal, the respondent can seek relief 
from removal in the second stage.202 There are numerous forms of relief in 
immigration court. The most commonly sought are asylum,203 cancellation of 
 
Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES 
ASS’N 86, 88-89 (2012). 
195  Id. at 89. 
196  Id. 
197  WENDY F. WHITE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL & FLAGSTAFF JUSTICE 
COURT, COURT HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION PROJECT 3 (2006), https://community.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=34fdeae8-c04e-a57d-9cca-
e5a8d4460252 [https://perma.cc/UHR7-BWNT]. 
198  Id. at 4. 
199  Id. 
200  Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 957-58 & 
fig.5 (2015). 
201  Id. at 957; see also Am. Immigration Council & Penn State Dickinson Sch. of Law, Practice 
Advisory: Notices to Appear: Legal Challenges and Strategies 7-16, American Immigration Council 
& Penn State (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV9-X7VY] 
(summarizing the government’s burden in establishing inadmissibility or deportability and 
providing strategies for requesting administrative closure or termination). 
202  Eagly, supra note 200, at 957. 
203  Asylum is a form of discretionary relief available to individuals who qualify as refugees by 
demonstrating past persecution or a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on the noncitizen’s 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and/or membership in a particular social group. I.N.A. 
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removal,204 and adjustment of status.205 To qualify for relief, a respondent 
must satisfy the applicable statutory eligibility requirements and convince the 
judge that the case merits the favorable exercise of discretion.206 A respondent 
who wins relief will be able to remain lawfully in the United States. 
Across the eleven years of our study period, 48% (n = 549,053 of 1,155,469) 
of nondetained (released or never detained) individuals in removal 
proceedings sought some form of relief prior to the initial completion in their 
cases.207 Among these individuals who sought relief, 72% had an asylum 
application (n = 392,788);208 28% applied for cancellation of removal for lawful 
permanent residents or non-lawful permanent residents (n = 151,561); and 10% 
applied for adjustment of status (n = 45,356). 
Using the all-matters method, we find that nondetained respondents 
applying for relief had very high appearance rates. Overall, 95% of all litigants 
with completed or pending applications for relief came to all of their court 
hearings between 2008 and 2018.209 This result makes sense: individuals 
pursuing claims for relief in court have a strong incentive to come to court so 
that they can win permission to remain in the United States.210 
 
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018); I.N.A. § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
Applicants for asylum may also be considered for relief under withholding of removal and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture by satisfying a more stringent standard. See I.N.A. 
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (providing statutory requirements for demonstrating eligibility 
for withholding of removal); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 882-93 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing the availability of relief 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture). 
204  Cancellation of removal is a form of relief available to both lawful permanent residents and 
undocumented individuals who have lived for a minimum number of years in the United States and 
who satisfy certain requirements. I.N.A. § 240A(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b). 
205  Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal available to any noncitizen who is 
determined eligible for lawful permanent resident status based on a visa petition approved by the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. I.N.A. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
206  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 203, at 725-26. 
207  Respondents may apply for multiple forms of relief with the immigration court. We did 
not consider applications for voluntary departure to be a form of relief. See supra note 97.  
208  EOIR Form I-589 includes an application for asylum and withholding of removal, and also 
offers the opportunity for an application of withholding of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture. See U.S. Customs & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Security & Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding 
of Removal (rev. Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/i-589 [https://perma.cc/6MJU-W5NY] 
(listing the information that an applicant is required to provide to apply for asylum and withholding 
of removal). By “asylum application,” we refer to an application for all three forms of relief. 
209  During the study period, there were 829,083 completed and pending cases with 
applications for relief on file (n = 549,053 initial completions with such applications, and n = 431,752 
initial immigration judge decisions with filed applications). Of these individuals, only 43,250 had an 
in absentia removal order, leading to in absentia rates of 5% for all matters, 8% for initial case 
completions, and 10% for immigration judge decisions. 
210  See Oren Root, Nat’l Dir., Appearance Assistance Program, Vera Inst. of Justice, The 
Appearance Assistance Program: An Alternative to Detention for Noncitizens in U.S. Immigration 
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Figure 4 presents the in absentia rates for nondetained respondents who 
sought relief in immigration court, organized by the most common types of 
relief (asylum, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status). We present 
these findings using all three possible measurements for in absentia removal:
as percentages of all immigration judge decisions on the merits, all initial case 
completions, and all matters. 
 
Figure 4: In Absentia Removal Rate, by Application Type and  
Calculation Method (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)211 
The in absentia rate for all matters is a particularly valuable metric for
respondents seeking relief. Litigating eligibility for relief in immigration 
court can take years and involves multiple court hearings that require
respondents to come to court. In a previous study, we found that cases in 
which respondents applied for relief had an average of just over seven 
hearings before the case was resolved.212 Over the eleven-year period of our 
study, we find that only 6% of all matters involving asylum applications ended 
with an in absentia order. For those seeking cancellation of removal, the in 
Removal Proceedings 2 (Apr. 2000), https://www.vera.org/publications/appearance-assistance-
program-alternative-to-detention [https://perma.cc/65A6-TQ38] (arguing that individuals with 
claims for relief are “good candidates for supervised release, as they have an incentive to appear at 
their hearings”). 
211  Figure 4 calculates the proportion of individuals ordered removed in absentia with any of the various 
forms of application for relief on file. Note that individuals may apply for more than one form of relief.
212  Analyzing removal cases decided between 2007 and 2012, we found that respondents with 
counsel had a mean of 7.7 hearings, while those without counsel had a mean of 7.1 hearings. Eagly 
& Shafer, supra note 51, at 65 tbl.6.
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absentia rate was even lower: only 3% of all matters seeking cancellation were 
associated with a failure to appear. Finally, among all matters in which the 
respondent sought adjustment of status the in absentia rate was only 2%.213 
These findings are noteworthy because they reveal that immigrants 
seeking relief are highly likely to come to court. Such statistics have not 
traditionally been part of the EOIR Yearbooks, which provides only overall 
rates, not ones organized by application type.214 
C. Judicial and Jurisdictional Variation 
We next explore whether the rate of in absentia removal varies by court 
location or by judge. Currently, there are sixty different cities in the United 
States that host immigration courts,215 and approximately 400 immigration 
judges appointed by the Attorney General of the United States.216 In previous 
work, we have found that courts in different geographic locations are associated 
with very different patterns in how they decide cases.217 Other important 
research on immigration courts has found large variation in how immigration 
judges decide their cases. In a trailblazing study that sounded an alarm on this 
issue, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag found 
that immigration judges varied so widely in their decisionmaking on asylum 
cases that the court system could best be understood as a game of chance: 
“refugee roulette.”218 More recent research on asylum decisions has found that 
the local political context of the immigration court is also associated with 
different case outcomes. For example, immigration judges were less likely to 
 
213  Among those seeking relief who also had attorneys, the in absentia rate for all matters was 
even lower: 2.9% for those seeking asylum, 1.9% for those seeking cancellation of removal, and 1.7% 
for those seeking adjustment of status. These measurements are not displayed in Figure 4. 
214  See supra Part I (summarizing data presented in the EOIR Yearbooks). In 2018, EOIR 
began to occasionally report in press releases and other documents statistics on in absentia rate among 
those seeking asylum. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration 
Review Releases Court Statistics, Announces Transparency Initiative (May 9, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-releases-court-statistics-announces-
transparency [https://perma.cc/T3EA-3JAK]. 
215  EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing [https://perma.cc/TWM6-7Y5E] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
216  Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/GWA9-P86E] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
217  See Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum 
Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 848-52 (2018). 
218  Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities 
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 327-49, 378 (2007). Early research by the Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse also identified disparities among immigration judges, even when 
isolating their analysis to the affirmative asylum petitions of nondetained Chinese nationals in the New 
York City area who were represented by counsel. Immigration Judges, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 31, 
2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 [https://perma.cc/RW26-GSL7]. 
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grant asylum if they sat in courts where the local economy was poor or in 
counties that voted Republican in the last two presidential elections.219  
Here, we are interested in the rate at which different courts, and judges 
within those courts, ordered in absentia removal. To analyze this question, we 
looked at the twenty-five court locations with the greatest number of 
nondetained initial case completions across the study period.220 For each of these 
top twenty-five court locations, we then calculated the in absentia rate as a 
percentage of that court’s initial case completions.221 The results of our analysis 
are displayed in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: In Absentia Removal as a Percentage of Initial Case Completions,  
by Court Location (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)222  
 
219 Daniel E. Chand, William D. Schreckhise & Marianne L. Bowers, The Dynamics of State 
and Local Contexts and Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions, 2017 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
182, 189-92 (2017); see also Kim & Semet, supra note 142, at 614-15, 618 tbl.1, 618 n.210 (explaining 
that immigration judges “may be influenced by the broader political and economic environment of 
the base city in which they sit”). 
220  We focus here on the twenty-five jurisdictions with the greatest number of nondetained 
initial case completions across our study period, accounting for almost nine out of ten of these 
completions (n = 1,027,694 of 1,155,469). 
221  Like EOIR, we define initial case completions as including both initial immigration judge 
decisions and other completions, which include administrative closures. See, e.g., EOIR 2016
YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at B2. 
222  Figure 5 provides descriptive statistics for the twenty-five jurisdictions from our 
Nondetained Removal Sample with the greatest number of initial case completions. Figure 5 includes 
the total number of initial case completions, the proportion of never-detained cases, the number of 
active immigration judges (that is, those with one hundred or more initial case completions 
annually), and the percentage of initial case completions that ended with in absentia removal.
2020] Measuring In Absentia Removal 869 
The variation in in absentia rates by city is striking. As seen in Figure 5, 
in absentia rates ranged from a high of 54% in Harlingen, Texas to a low of 
15% in New York City. The three courts that handled the highest numbers of 
nondetained cases during our study—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New 
York—also had among the lowest in absentia rates. 
Some of these differences across jurisdictions no doubt reflect different 
migrant populations at these court locations. In column 3 of Figure 5 we 
calculate by jurisdiction the percentage of nondetained initial case 
completions that involved respondents who were never detained (as opposed 
to being released from detention). In Harlingen, Texas, for example, only 20% 
of initial case completions were for never-detained respondents; the 
remaining 80% were for individuals who were released from detention. 
Interestingly, however, there was still wide variation in in absentia removal 
rates across cities with similar proportions of never-detained cases. For 
example, approximately two thirds of the dockets in both San Francisco and 
Dallas were composed of cases of individuals who were never detained, but 
the in absentia rate in San Francisco was 19%, compared to 41% in Dallas. 
At least some of this deviation in appearance rates reflects differences in 
local court practices. For example, some local courts may have better and 
more timely systems in place for scheduling court hearings and notifying 
respondents about their upcoming court hearings. A 2017 DOJ on-site review 
of the immigration court in Baltimore, Maryland, found that the court was 
so understaffed as caseloads grew that administrators were unable to enter 
change-of-address paperwork sent to the court into their computer system.223 
This problem means that respondents would not receive their court notices, 
which the report warned “can result in respondents being ordered removed 
in absentia through no fault of their own.”224 As our data reveal, 33% of 
respondents in the Baltimore court were removed in absentia.225 
Another court practice that is associated with whether respondents came 
to court is the length of delay between the issuance of the NTA and the initial 
court date. Looking only at never-detained initial case completions,226 we 
found that the average time between the filing of the NTA and the initial 
 
223  Ani Ucar, Leaked Report Shows the Utter Dysfunction of Baltimore’s Immigration Court, VICE 
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/xw94ea/leaked-report-shows-
the-utter-dysfunction-of-baltimores-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/K6J6-DGWT]. 
224  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225  See supra Figure 5. 
226  To address the potential relationship between delays in court scheduling and in absentia 
removal, we narrowed our analysis from all initial case completions to only never-detained initial 
case completions with no prior change of venue or transfer (n = 745,031 of 1,155,469). Of the 
remaining 745,031 initial case completions, we excluded 4,678 cases (less than 1%) with missing or 
erroneous NTAs. Finally, to focus on more active cases, we narrowed the analysis further, excluding 
the 3% of remaining cases (n = 21,638) with NTAs dated prior to 2006. 
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hearing was 239 days (SD = 251) for cases that ended in absentia. By 
comparison, on average there were only 167 days (SD = 197) between the filing 
of the NTA and the first hearing in never-detained cases that did not end in 
absentia. The median number of days showed similar patterns: 153 days 
median for cases ending in absentia, compared to 101 days median for cases 
not ending in absentia. This finding suggests that, on average, long delays can 
make it harder for people to receive proper notice, remember their court 
hearings, and remain in contact with the court. 
The availability of counsel in different jurisdictions is an additional 
contributing factor to variation in failures to appear. In previous work, we 
found that some cities have very few practicing immigration attorneys. These 
problems were most acute in smaller cities where detained courts tend to be 
located. For example, we found that Lumpkin, Georgia, did not have a single 
practicing immigration lawyer, and Oakdale, Louisiana, had only four.227 As 
a result, the rate of attorney representation also varies dramatically between 
immigration courts.228 
Figure 6 displays the relationship between the in absentia removal rates 
and access to counsel in these twenty-five court locations. Notably, those 
cities with the highest in absentia rates also had the lowest representation 
rates. For example, as seen in the upper-left corner of Figure 6, in Harlingen, 
Texas, where 54% of nondetained respondents were ordered removed in 
absentia, only 41% of nondetained respondents had counsel. In sharp contrast, 
as seen in the lower-right corner of Figure 6, 85% of nondetained respondents 
in New York City’s immigration court had counsel,229 and only 15% were 
removed in absentia. 
 
  
 
227  Eagly & Shafer, supra note 51, at 42. 
228  See id. at 40 (“In the busiest twenty nondetained court jurisdictions, representation rates 
reached as high as 87% in New York City and 78% in San Francisco. At the low end of these 
twenty high-volume nondetained jurisdictions, only 47% of immigrants in Atlanta and Kansas City 
secured representation.”). 
229  This high representation rate reflects the 2014 establishment of a project known as the New 
York Immigrant Family Unity Project, which provides free legal representation to any individual in 
New York’s immigration court who is unable to afford counsel. New York Immigrant Family Unity 
Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-
family-unity-project [https://perma.cc/DZ26-62X3] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
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Figure 6: Relationship Between In Absentia Removal Rate and Representation 
by Counsel, by Base City (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only)230 
 
Variation across immigration courts could also reflect differences in 
judicial decisionmaking on when to issue an in absentia order. To explore this 
issue, we examined the in absentia rates of individual judges who had at least 
one hundred nondetained initial case completions during the study period, 
what we call active judges.231 Figure 7 displays the in absentia rates for active 
judges in the top twenty-five busiest court locations. Each individual judge is 
represented by a pipe (“|”).232 These markings visually depict variation 
among judges at the city level. For example, the seventeen active judges in 
Houston ordered in absentia removal at surprisingly different rates, from a low 
of 16% to a high of 92%. Similarly, in Baltimore, one active judge ordered in 
absentia removal in almost every single case, whereas three judges had in 
absentia rates below 30%. 
 
230  Figure 5 analyzes the twenty-five jurisdictions from our Nondetained Removal Sample 
with the greatest number of initial case completions. In it, we compare the in absentia removal rate 
at the initial case completion with the overall representation rate in the jurisdiction.
231  Focusing on these active judges allows us to more reliably analyze commonalities and 
variations within jurisdictions. During our study period, these active judges accounted for 99% of 
all initial case completions (n = 1,015,606 of 1,027,694 initial case completions) in the busiest twenty-five
jurisdictions. 
232  In addition, the total number of active immigration judges in each jurisdiction is listed 
alongside the city on the y-axis of Figure 7.
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Figure 7: In Absentia Removal Rate for Active Judges,  
by Court Location (2008–2018) (Nondetained Only) 
 
Acknowledging judicial variation within cities underscores that judges in 
different jurisdictions do vary in their approaches to ordering in absentia
removal. Even so, the overall pattern across these different court locations 
remains striking.233 This finding suggests that local court practices and norms 
are relevant to shaping how judges within different jurisdictions rule when 
faced with a respondent who does not come to court.234 
In summary, Part III builds on the methods introduced in Part II to analyze 
the relationship between in absentia removal and attorney representation, 
applications for relief, and court jurisdiction. We show that respondents who 
have attorneys almost always come to court, as do those who seek relief in court. 
Rates of in absentia removal also vary by judicial district, although individual 
judges within those districts also order in absentia removal at uneven rates. As 
233 See supra Figure 5.
234  Research in the context of the federal criminal courts has similarly found that judges are 
influenced by the local court context within which they practice. See, e.g., Brian Johnson et al., The 
Social Context of Guidelines Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737, 
737-38, 767-73 (2008) (finding that organizational court context was associated with variations across 
federal district courts in the likelihood of judge-initiated downward departures in sentencing 
decisions); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian D. Johnson, Organizational Conformity and Punishment: Federal 
Court Communities and Judge-Initiated Guidelines Departures, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 
266-89 (2017) (finding variation in sentencing practices of federal judges at the local district court 
level was associated with local organizational culture and expectations).
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we now discuss in the Conclusion, these findings have implications for how 
immigration courts adjudicate cases and other policy debates. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this Article with a simple question: Do immigrants come to 
their immigration court hearings? Contrary to the claims of current 
government officials that immigrants “never” come to court, our data-driven 
analysis reveals that 88% of all immigrants in immigration court with 
completed or pending removal cases over the past eleven years have attended 
all their court hearings.235 Limiting our analysis to only nondetained cases, 
we still find a high compliance rate: 83% of all nondetained respondents in 
completed or pending removal cases attended all their hearings since 2008.236 
These and other measurements of in absentia removal presented in this Article 
contest recent claims by President Trump and other government officials that 
almost all immigrants abscond from court. 
A key insight of our analysis is that the method chosen for measuring 
failures to appear matters. As we have set forth, the method adopted by the 
government to measure rates of in absentia removal—as a percentage of initial 
immigration judge decisions—ignores a large number of court cases in which 
respondents continue to appear in court. In particular, the government’s 
measurement ignores cases that are administratively closed, an essential tool 
that has been used by immigration judges over the past decade to remove 
cases indefinitely from the immigration court’s docket. The government’s 
measurement also ignores the historically high number of backlogged cases 
pending in immigration courts today. These backlogs matter because 
nondetained deportation cases now take many court hearings and several 
years to resolve. This Article has argued that counting administrative 
completions and pending cases in the in absentia removal measurement is a 
necessary complement to the government’s measurement that enhances 
public understanding of the rate at which noncitizens are complying with 
their court dates. We recommend that future statistical reporting by the 
EOIR include these measurements. 
As this Article has shown, immigration court compliance rates must be 
considered against the backdrop of a pervasive failure of the Department of 
Homeland Security to include the time and date of hearings in the charging 
documents given to individuals in removal proceedings. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions has put the spotlight on the challenges 
that respondents often face in finding out about their court dates. This reality 
 
235  See supra Table 6 and accompanying text. 
236  See supra Table 7 and accompanying text. 
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has made it hard for individuals—particularly if they do not speak English, 
are unfamiliar with the court system, and do not have lawyers—to figure out 
when and where to go to court. The fact that half of in absentia decisions over 
the past decade were issued at the first or second court hearing237 reveals that 
immigration judges have been quick to penalize respondents for not 
appearing in court. In light of these issues, one simple reform that could be 
implemented is to train judges to use the first hearing to ensure that proper 
notice was provided before issuing any in absentia finding. The immigration 
courts could also learn from the proven success of other court systems in 
providing reminder calls or postcards with the accurate time and date of the 
hearing. 
Our Article also contributes to the growing understanding of 
jurisdictional variation in immigration court decisionmaking. We find that 
rates of in absentia removal varied widely based on the geographic location of 
the immigration court. While factors such as the availability of immigration 
attorneys and local prosecutorial practices no doubt contribute to these 
patterns, our findings suggest that local court practices for handling failures 
to appear play a salient and underappreciated role in how cases are resolved. 
Greater training of immigration judges to ensure consistency in their 
application of the in absentia process—which requires the government to 
prove that written notice of the hearing was provided and that the respondent 
is subject to removal—is essential. 
Unlike government reports that ignore the subsequent history of in absentia 
orders, this Article also explored whether in absentia orders withstood later 
review. Since 2008, 15% of those who were ordered removed in absentia have 
successfully reopened their cases and had their in absentia orders rescinded.238 
This crucial finding suggests that many individuals who are removed in absentia 
wanted to attend their court hearings but never received notice or faced 
hardship in getting to court. 
We believe that giving immigration judges greater independence to give 
respondents a second chance to come to court would help address this issue 
and enhance court appearance rates. The immigration law gave judges this 
independence prior to 1990, and this earlier version of the law could provide 
a starting point for reform.239 Indeed, before the 1990 change in the law when 
judges were given more discretion on how to handle failures to appear in 
court, they often exercised caution by not ordering deportation when they 
were concerned that respondents might not have received notice of the 
 
237  See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text. 
238  See supra Table 8 and accompanying text. 
239  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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hearing.240 Our independent analysis of current EOIR data reveals that in 
those rare cases where immigration judges did give individuals a second 
chance to come to court, half did show up at the next hearing.241 
Other essential reforms that our research supports include removing case 
quotas and aggressive case completion goals. Immigration judges are already under 
immense stress in their jobs.242 Placing heightened pressure on immigration 
judges to complete their cases more quickly can improperly influence judges to 
issue in absentia orders in haste, even when notice is clearly inadequate. 
More ambitiously, this study supports the growing momentum behind 
creating an independent structure for the immigration courts.243 The federal 
tax and bankruptcy courts provide precedent for creating specialized federal 
courts under Article I of the United States Constitution.244 Such an 
independent court structure would help to reduce the prevalence of in absentia 
orders by giving immigration judges more authority over their dockets and 
individual case decisions.245 
 
240  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-18, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: 
DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 30 (1989), 
http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/140072.pdf [https://perma.cc/U88N-C6SN] (noting that immigration 
judges in New York and Los Angeles interviewed prior to 1990 “said they are willing to hold 
deportation hearings in absentia only if they are convinced that the aliens received proper 
notification of the time and place of the hearing”). 
241  See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
242  Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National 
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 60 (2008) 
(finding that the burnout level of federal immigration judges was higher than the levels reported by 
hospital physicians and prison wardens). 
243  In 2018, Senators Mazie K. Hirono, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Kamala Harris introduced the 
Immigration Court Improvement Act, a bill that would insulate immigration judges from top-down 
political interference. Press Release, Sen. Mazie K. Hirono, Hirono, Gillibrand, Harris 
Introduce Bill to Insulate Immigration Judges from Political Interference 1 (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://hirono.senate.gov/news/press-releases/hirono-gillibrand-harris-introduce-bill-to-insulate-
immigration-judges-from-political-interference [https://perma.cc/CPR4-748M]. An early proposal 
for an independent immigration court was made prior to the establishment of the EOIR by Maurice 
Roberts, the former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Maurice Roberts, Proposed: A 
Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1980). 
244  The Federal Bar Association (FBA) recently completed a report proposing model 
legislation to establish an Article I immigration court. See Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-
priorities/article-i-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/CQ5D-C2AU] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
The FBA proposal is supported by the union representing immigration judges, the National 
Association of Immigration Judges. See Letter from Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n 
of Immigration Judges, to Elizabeth Stevens, President, Fed. Bar Ass’n, Immigration Law Section 
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_endorses_FBA_Article
_I_proposal_3-15-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC29-BVH3] (endorsing the Federal Bar Association’s 
proposed legislation due to the “proven . . . conflicts of interest” that arise when immigration courts 
can be used as “political pawn[s] by various administrations on both sides of the aisle”). 
245  Although the creation of an Article I immigration court would solve many problems within 
the court system, as Amit Jain has warned, such a change must be accompanied by other procedural 
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The complex and nuanced picture of in absentia removal presented in this 
Article also has immediate relevance to the current debates in which statistics 
on failures to appear play a key role. For example, our finding that the vast 
majority of nondetained respondents attend their court hearings does not 
support initiatives for stricter detention rules and expanded detention 
capacity.246 Rather, this study supports releasing more respondents from 
custody given the high likelihood that they will attend their future court 
hearings. Our analysis showing that asylum seekers almost always attend their 
court hearings similarly undermines arguments that asylum seekers should be 
prevented from entering the country out of a fear they will not come to 
court.247 And our data showing that noncitizens with lawyers have near 
perfect attendance rates suggests that expanding funding for pro bono 
lawyers and know-your-rights programs could play an important part in 
improving the functioning of the immigration court system.248 
Our overarching goal in this Article is to encourage policymakers and 
future researchers to think critically about how to measure in absentia 
removal. This topic has generated considerable debate and much confusion 
in the past. It has also led to the increasing incarceration of noncitizens. Our 
data-driven analysis uses the government’s own court database to insert 
verifiable measurements into the discussion. Moreover, we present 
alternative methods of measurement that can be relied upon in future 
research to produce reliable and understandable measurements. 
 
and substantive forms. Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,” 
33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 324 (2019). 
246  See supra Table 7 and accompanying text. 
247  See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text. 
248  See supra Figure 3 and accompanying text. 
